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The growing popularity of e-commerce transactions revives the 
perennial question of consumer contract law: should non-salient 
provisions of consumer standard form contracts be enforced? 
With the focus presently on an ex-ante analysis, scholars debate 
whether consumers can and should read standardized terms at 
the time of contracting. 
In today’s information age, such a focus might be misguided. 
The online realm furnishes various tools, so-called “Web 2.0” 
applications, which encourage the flow of information from  
experienced to prospective consumers. This Article, therefore, 
reframes the analysis of online consumer contracts while taking 
into account this new flow of information. In doing so, we draw 
out several typical ways in which such information flows in the 
online realm, while addressing the role of search engines, blogs, 
message boards and social networks. The Article also accounts 
for the major challenges to the success of such information flow: 
the motivations of both information providers and receivers, and 
the accreditation of the data which might be compromised both 
unintentionally and maliciously.  
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After applying the key “law and economics” and “behavioral 
law and economics” insights pertaining to consumer contracts 
to the new dynamic created by the online environment, we con-
clude that this online information flow will strengthen market 
forces’ ability to generate a fair and balanced contractual equi-
librium. We accordingly provide new policy recommendations 
that are better tailored to deal with online consumer contracts 
and thus limit the need for legal intervention in the market for 
consumer contract terms.  
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Introduction 
For many decades, numerous consumer transactions between firms 
and individuals have been accommodated by, and executed through, 
standard form contracts (“SFCs”).1 Form contracting will presumably 
continue to predominate, as modern technology and recent developments 
bring new and improved standard contracting practices into the market. 
One prominent example is online contracting, which is constantly grow-
ing in breadth and scope.2 Almost all online interactions are governed by 
standard terms incorporated in SFCs. Within this broader feature, online 
standard contracting dominates retail transactions, sometimes referred to 
as B2C (Business-to-Consumer).3  
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971).  
 2. In 2004, total online consumer spending in the US rose by 26%, from $93.2 billion 
(in 2003) to $117.4 billion. See eMarketer.com, Online Consumer Spending Up in 2004, 
Jan.12, 2005, http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?1003212. Consumer online spending in 
2005 rose constantly, amounting to $143.2 billion. See Jack Loechner, Consumer Spending 
Out of the Gate Fast in 2006, Feb. 8, 2006, http://publications.mediapost.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=39442. Total consumer online spending 
continued to increase in 2006. See, e.g., Metrics 2.0, http://www.metrics2.com/blog/2006/10/ 
26/online_consumer_spending_to_hit_170_billion_in_200.html (Oct. 26, 2006, 9:12 EST).  
 3. The following analysis is premised on the assumption that, at least for the time 
being, online B2C contracts will be governed by SFC. We make this assumption explicit since 
the digital environment can potentially offer a very different contractual setting, providing 
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This Article joins a growing body of scholarship that addresses 
online SFCs. Yet it makes a unique contribution in singling out the im-
portance of the flow of information from the ex post stage (after the 
contract has been formulated) to the ex ante stage (before the contract 
has been formulated by the relevant parties). As we will show, such a 
flow—which characterizes the online world in general and as a “Web 
2.0”4 phenomenon in particular—exerts a profound impact on contract-
ing practices, and the role of regulators and courts addressing online 
SFCs.5  
The social, economic, and psychological literature on new online 
trends and behavioral patterns stemming from the emergence of the 
“Web 2.0” phenomenon has enjoyed abundant attention from legal 
scholars in recent years. Yet there is a marked gap in the application of 
these novel insights to legal theory in general and contract law in par-
ticular. This Article attempts to fill a substantial part of the gap in respect 
of consumer contracts.  
To meet the Article’s objective, we pursue three themes. First, we 
explore how e-commerce contracting practices diverge from real-world 
standard contract formation. Second, we examine where and how the 
new tools of social interaction and information dissemination that the 
Internet offers, such as online blogs, virtual communities, and places of 
virtual congregation, can promote efficient and fair B2C contracting. 
Third, we suggest policy recommendations for courts and legislatures 
when they confront the evolving issue of online standard form contract-
ing.  
Before proceeding, we hereby briefly define the boundaries of this 
Article’s analysis. First, we focus on online B2C transactions in competi-
tive markets,6 addressing concerns of asymmetric information between 
                                                                                                                      
consumers with an “electronic butler” that will automatically signal the consumers’ contrac-
tual preferences to the various vendors. For a recent description of this dynamic, see 
Lawrence Lessig, Code: V 2.0 226–30 (2006). See also Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate 
Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1223 (2006). 
Still, the “electronic butler” is far from becoming reality.  
 4. “Web 2.0” stands for a variety of online phenomena that involve the creation of 
content, rankings, and other forms of value through the active participation of users. For a 
critical view of the term “Web 2.0,” see John C. Dvorak, Web 2.0 Baloney, PC Mag., Mar. 1, 
2007, available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1931858,00.asp. 
 5. As we explain infra, the results of our analysis should also affect the overall dis-
course on SFCs policy (i.e., in the offline world as well), especially where offline contracting 
parties use the relevant information available from the online realm (for the offline transac-
tion). Our analysis in this Article is less ambitious, concentrating only on online markets and 
transactions.  
 6. For a general discussion of the e-commerce business realm and the policy issues it 
raises, see Jay Kesan & Andrea Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 72 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1497 (2004). See also Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law, Eco-
nomics and Cyberspace (2004).  
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the contracting parties.7 We leave aside an inquiry into whether online 
B2C contracts require consumer protection regulation due to lack of 
competition.8 Second, we discuss online SFCs, and not the entire scope 
of e-commerce transactions and related consumer-protection issues.9 
Third, our analysis posits that the SFC between the online vendor and 
consumer is indeed a binding contract, resulting from the consumer’s 
informed assent to the terms of the contract offered by the vendor.10 Our 
underlying assumption is that in most B2C transactions courts will deem 
online SFCs to meet the standards of contract formation, yet might exer-
cise great willingness to review their content.11  
                                                                                                                      
 7. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Com-
petitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 827 (2006) (stating, as a starting point, 
that “[t]he usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market with-
out informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be 
optimal”).  
 8. At first blush, online B2C markets should be increasingly competitive in view of 
the relatively low barriers to entry. On the other hand, entering this market might entail heavy 
expenses associated with the successful launch of an e-commerce venture, especially in pro-
motion and forwarding of brand recognition. 
 9. This Article does not deal with contractual terms that are specifically set for every 
consumer, such as price or quantity. It also does not address issues considered salient in con-
sumer transactions such as time, quantity and form of delivery. Nor does it concern instances 
in which vendors choose to breach their contractual obligations or simply disappear, leaving 
consumers without their product or their money.  
 10. The unique characteristics of SFCs have led some scholars to question the basic 
assumption that such agreements are indeed contracts. For a recent example, see Omri Ben-
Shahar, Foreword to Boilerplate: Foundation of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 Mich. L. 
Rev. 821, 826 (2006) (“On a theoretical level, boilerplate is shown to be a legal phenomenon 
different from contract. Is it a statute? Is it property? Is it a product?”). In the online realm this 
ongoing debate takes an additional twist, as these contracts are not accepted by the consumer 
in the customary form of signing a legal document. Instead, consumers allegedly enter the 
contract by clicking on a designated “box” or link (“clickwrap”), or simply by consenting to 
browse through subsequent pages on the site (“browsewrap”). With such transactions, courts 
take into account the way the contractual provisions were displayed, as well as the attributes 
of the underlying transaction: Was it B2B (Business-to-Business) or B2C? Was it an actual 
sale or merely terms of service governing access to the relevant website? And the like. For a 
general judicial analysis of contract formation in clickwrap and browsewrap contracts, see 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2002). For a discussion of this 
issue, see Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (2006). Most courts seem to 
find “clickwrap” agreements to constitute a binding agreement. See id.; Juliet Moringiello, 
Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 1307, 1323–24 & n.82 (2005); 
see also Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632 (8th Cir. 2005) (accepting clickwrap 
as assent); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532−33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999) (finding a clickwrap agreement enforceable). 
 11. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 701–02 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (holding the America Online forum selection clause invalid); Comb v. PayPal, 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding the arbitration clause substantively 
unconscionable). But see, Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (up-
holding Google’s AdWords contract which included a mandatory venue clause).  
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The remainder of the Article is arranged as follows: Part I provides 
the necessary background to B2C SFCs. Here we tackle the substantial 
scope of the theoretical work addressing this issue, while referring to the 
contribution of the doctrinal fields of “law and economics” and “behav-
ioral law and economics.” Part II expands on the notion of information 
flow from the ex post consumers to the ex ante ones. Part III examines 
the ex post–ex ante information flow in the specific context and dynam-
ics of the Internet. In Part IV we revisit the analysis of the various 
dynamics of B2C SFCs, concentrating on the online setting and bearing 
in mind the effects of the online trends discussed in Part III. We then 
provide policy recommendations in Part V. 
I. The Policy Landscape 
This Part begins by setting out the suspicion toward SFCs existing in 
today’s legal doctrine. It then discusses the conventional “law and eco-
nomics” responses to this position. Thereafter it briefly explores the 
main advantages of using SFCs. Subsequently it presents the “law and 
economics” anti-intervention approach and the critiques of this concept. 
A. The Unequal Bargaining Power Argument  
According to the basic paradigm of contract law, a contract is the re-
sult of a negotiation process among parties who exercise their freedom to 
contract. SFCs, however, are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and 
are rarely the outcome of any bargaining. SFCs include provisions de-
termined in advance by one party, which is superior in terms of 
bargaining and market power. Very commonly, merely the seller’s agents 
negotiate and contract with individual consumers. These agents are not 
usually authorized to make changes or concessions in the standardized 
agreements they offer.12 Seldom can an SFC be negotiated and altered.13 
Furthermore, consumers are the typical “one-shot players,” whereas 
businesses have innumerable opportunities to draft and litigate contracts, 
and are thus sophisticated “repeat players.”14 Arguably, these elements 
                                                                                                                      
 12. But see Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of the Bargain: An Economic Theory of 
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and 
Consumers, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 877 (2006) (arguing that employees have a great deal of 
discretion to satisfy consumers). 
 13. For an anecdote that captures this line of reasoning see, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, 
supra note 7, at 830–31 (mentioning the failure of one of the authors to alter a standardized 
term found in an agreement between the author and Harvard University Press). 
 14. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, 3 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 
98–103 (1974).  
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increase the disparity in terms of bargaining power between firms and 
individual consumers.  
B. A Law & Economics Perspective  
The unique traits of SFCs discussed above have rendered them al-
most derogatory. Standard form contracting is subject to constant 
criticism by courts, legislators, academics and society in general. Yet, 
from a classic law and economics perspective, most of the traditional 
allegations against SFCs, namely the offer of form contracts by agents 
not empowered to make contextual changes, execution between unfamil-
iar parties, and inequality in economic strength, do not necessarily pose 
serious challenges to contract law. According to the most basic concepts 
of Law and Economics (hereinafter L&E), both contracting parties are 
assumed to accept only efficient contracts that maximize their utility.15  
Furthermore, firms’ overall usage of SFCs actually carries many ad-
vantages. The SFCs substantially reduces transaction costs by 
eliminating negotiations over contractual terms.16 SFCs also allow ven-
dors to cut expenses by reducing costs of training their employees and 
agents. Use of the SFC increases the vendor’s efficiency as well: it can 
serve as a repeated check on selling agents who might be too eager to 
provide offers that run counter the vendor’s interest. Since all consumers 
are presented with an identical contract, SFCs can signify equality 
among consumers (assuming that the vendor does not engage in contract 
terms’ discrimination),17 thereby increasing consumers’ confidence.18 
Lastly, open market transactions which apply SFCs are assumed to  
                                                                                                                      
 15. Therefore, some scholars question the widely accepted notion that SFCs provisions 
are “pro-seller”. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 
42 Hous. L. Rev. 975, 979 (2005); Johnston, supra note 12, at 887. 
 16. Since SFCs are utilized to minimize negotiation costs, individual exchanges are not 
a sufficient reason to reopen the bargaining terms, which were drafted in advance. Still, forms 
typically do leave blank spaces for salient and regularly variable aspects of bargains such as 
quantity, price, method of payment, and day of delivery. Such salient terms are not central to 
our analysis.  
 17. We mean ex ante discrimination, i.e., the sellers’ ability to offer different contracts 
to different consumers. If the seller can identify sophisticated consumers and offer them better 
contracts, its incentive to draft fair contracts to all consumers diminishes. Vendors might en-
gage in ex post discrimination as well, which implies that sophisticated or assertive consumers 
will obtain relief after a dispute arises whereas lay consumers will not. Assertive and sophisti-
cated consumers—knowing the likelihood of relief later on—will not be motivated to read (let 
alone negotiate the alteration of) contract terms at time of contracting. Cf. Bebchuk & Posner, 
supra note 7 (arguing that reputation concerns will lead vendors to insist on one-sided contract 
terms only in response to opportunistic behavior on the part of buyers); Johnston, supra note 
12, at 876 (providing anecdotal evidence that almost everything relating to SFCs can be re-
negotiated when consumers display an assertive approach).  
 18. Another important aspect is how the contracting parties split the transaction’s sur-
plus. This aspect of wealth distribution will not be tackled here. 
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promote the welfare of both parties. Although consumer SFCs are basi-
cally non-negotiable, firms and consumers are assumed to share the 
benefits gained from such contracts.19 Therefore, contract law should 
merely seek to address market failures that undercut the parties’ ability 
to maximize their utility rather than the intricacies of the SFCs. 
Commentators go on to question courts’ competence in deciding ex 
post what would have constituted a fair contractual allocation of risks 
and obligations among the parties ex ante.20 In most cases, courts’ lack 
the necessary expertise to analyze the specific transaction and market 
that any given SFC addresses. Courts might also have difficulty under-
standing the relation between concessions made in one contractual 
provision and benefits rendered in another. Legal intervention in the 
terms of SFCs also constitute acts of blunt state paternalism, which en-
croach on the contracting parties’ autonomy. Some academics argue that 
the very fact that firms are repeat players places them in the best position 
to assess the appropriate content of form contracts.21 
The views mentioned thus far have led to an ongoing policy debate 
regarding the enforcement of SFCs. This debate has also resulted in a 
variety of policy recommendations, some of which argue for intervention 
both by court and legislatures. Legislatures are asked to regulate contract 
terms ex ante and set legal rules permitting courts to strike down unde-
sired and inappropriate contract terms. Courts, on the other hand, are 
called on to provide judicial review of SFCs terms ex post.22 To counter 
these assertions, prominent L&E scholars articulate another influential 
argument against extensive intervention in the market for consumer con-
tract terms. We now address this position.  
C. The Law & Economics Non-Intervention Approach 
L&E scholars’ Non-Intervention Approach (hereinafter NIA) is 
premised on competitive market forces. These forces allegedly generate 
a desired equilibrium at which vendors have adequate incentives to draft 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of 
an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 Hastings L.J. 635, 638 
(1996); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 583, 594 (1990).  
 20. See Gillette, supra note 15, at 982.  
 21. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 743, 751 (2002). 
 22. In the US, courts frequently apply the doctrine of unconscionability in this context. 
Other doctrines include, inter alia, unfair surprise, the duty to contract in good faith, the rea-
sonable expectation doctrine, and the like. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. 
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 456 
(2002). 
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efficient standardized terms.23 The proponents of the NIA acknowledge 
that SFCs terms are not typically read by consumers prior to finalizing 
the transaction. Yet in competitive markets, the fact that some consumers 
(hereinafter Marginal Consumers) do read contractual provisions, and 
are willing to search for better ones, should suffice. By this reasoning, a 
vendor that applies unfair or unjust provisions in its contract risks losing 
Marginal Consumers to a competitor that offers preferable contractual 
terms. As firms respond to consumers in the aggregate, and provide 
products that will match their preferences, firms in competitive markets 
will presumably refrain from exploiting consumers through self-serving 
contract clauses incorporated in SFCs.24 Hence, the NIA relies on the 
existence of market pressure, generated by a crucial group of Marginal 
Consumers. Such a dynamic will only emerge in markets in which the 
cost of losing Marginal Consumers (due to the use of unfair contractual 
terms) will outweigh the benefits of extorting infra-marginal consumers 
(who remain subject to the unfair and biased contractual provisions).25  
Taking the NIA into account, the policy response to the fear of unfair 
SFCs should be limited to encouraging the usage of simple, short, and 
plain language contracts. This will assist Marginal Consumers in signal-
ing their discontent with the given SFC. Also, regulators should promote 
competition, which will render Marginal Consumers more powerful and 
will ensure that they have sufficient options to switch to, thereby indicat-
ing their dissatisfaction with biased SFCs.26  
D. The NIA Challenged 
Several scholars, holding varying viewpoints, have critiqued the 
NIA. Such critiques question the NIA’s accuracy and assumptions. We 
mention these critiques briefly here, and discuss them in greater depth 
below.  
1. Law & Economic Critiques27 
Critics argue the NIA fails to ensure the fairness of SFCs. First, high 
transaction costs that typically accompany everyday consumer transac-
tions will prevent even the most sophisticated consumers from reading 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for 
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 
(1983).  
 24. See id.; Alan Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research 
Agenda, 19 Can. Bus. L.J. 437 (1991).  
 25. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, supra note 23.  
 26. See id. 
 27. The discussion in this part relies on Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in 
Consumer Contracts: A Challenge that Is Yet to be Met, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2008).  
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SFCs;28 many provisions in SFCs refer to credence qualities that are dif-
ficult to identify and evaluate at the time of contract formation.29 
Uniformity of terms in SFCs may hamper the consumer’s incentive to 
read as well.30 This last argument is strengthened by a game-theory ob-
servation that rational consumers are expected to be trapped in a free-
rider dilemma.31  
Other NIA challengers argue that even if a sufficient number of 
Marginal Consumers exists, the contractual preferences of this group 
plausibly differ from those of the general pool of consumers.32 Firms 
might also misperceive Marginal Consumers’ preferences and behavior. 
This is because large vending and retail firms assign their salespeople 
(rather than their policymakers) to interact and contract with consumers. 
Thus, these employees might not convey the relevant data throughout the 
corporate structure.33 In addition, discrimination, both ex post and ex 
ante, between Marginal Consumers and non-marginal can undercut the 
model’s effectiveness as it allows the seller to provide informed consum-
ers with better contracts.34 
2. Behavioral Law & Economics Critiques 
Critics have also questioned the NIA from a newer interdisciplinary 
perspective: that of behavioral L&E. Critics taking this approach seek to 
further demonstrate that consumers are unlikely to read an SFC, nor 
wholly understand its contents. Here we discuss four specific behavioral 
patterns particularly relevant to standard form contracting practices.35  
First is the problem of information overload. Individuals’ cognitive 
limitations on information processing can undermine optimal contract-
                                                                                                                      
 28. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Con-
tract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 243 (1995) (discussing transaction costs occurring during the 
formation of contracts).  
 29. See Meyerson, supra note 19, at 596–97. Examples of credence qualities are arbi-
tration and forum selection clauses, which the average consumer rarely experiences.  
 30. Merely asserting that SFCs are similar in some fields of commerce does not neces-
sarily mean they are inefficient. To the contrary, uniformity of terms might be a positive 
indication signaling that an industry is competitive. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 
439. Therefore, consumer protection proponents seek to prove that terms are similar, but also 
that they are unfavorable and one-sided. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic of Offer and Ac-
ceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 249–93 
(1990); Slawson, supra note 1, at 530–31.  
 31. As Avery Katz explains, every rational consumer is expected to opt to leave the task 
of reading SFCs to other consumers. See Katz, supra note 30, at 530–31. 
 32. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 19, at 671.  
 33. Becher, supra note 27, at 25.  
 34. For definitions of ex post and ex ante discrimination, see supra text accompanying 
note 17.  
 35. For a detailed discussion, see Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer 
Standard Form Contracts 68 La. L. Rev. 117 (2007). 
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ing. As Russell Korobkin explains, the information overload that con-
sumers experience when confronted with SFCs causes them to focus on 
only few components.36 These are typically the contractual provisions 
concerning price and other conspicuous (“salient”) product attributes. 
Consumers ignore non-salient provisions, such as terms governing 
choice of law, forum selection, remedies in the event of breach, ex-
change policies, etc.  
Second, in many instances consumers enter SFCs under unfavorable 
circumstances. The setting and environment in which SFCs are formu-
lated are frequently characterized by noise, time constraints and vendors’ 
attempts to manipulate consumers.37 These factors prevent consumers 
from engaging in a reasonable, let alone optimal, deliberation as to 
whether to enter the SFC.  
Third, consumers have limited ability to evaluate prospects of future 
contingencies and risks, especially where such prospects are of unpleas-
ant situations. Most SFCs terms address unpleasant events, such as legal 
disputes and payment defaults. The availability cascade38 and the preva-
lence of self-serving biases, such as over-optimism and over-
confidence,39 explain why most SFCs terms are not evaluated correctly 
ex ante.  
The fourth behavioral argument is premised on the fact that buyers 
are usually introduced to the SFC after a lengthy shopping period. At 
this stage consumers are unlikely to ascribe the full meaning or impor-
tance of the relevant contract. This is explained by psychological 
phenomena such as the sunk cost effect40 and cognitive dissonance.41 
These phenomena lead consumers to suffer from a perception of self-
commitment, which is also a product of their pre-contractual investment 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1220 (2003). 
 37. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 448.  
 38. The term “availability cascades” suggests that people perceive risks as more serious 
when a relevant incident is “readily called to mind or ‘available’.” Cass R. Sunstein, Introduc-
tion to Behavioral Law and Economics 1, 5 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).  
 39. For instance, most people believe they are less likely than others to suffer from 
automobile accidents, heart attacks, smoking diseases, and other health risks. Neil D. 
Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 Sci. 1232 (1989). 
 40. The “sunk cost” effect means that people will tend to continue a previously chosen 
course of action once they have invested resources in their previous choice. See Hal R. Arkes 
& Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Proc-
ess 124 (1985). 
 41. Cognitive dissonance means that to avoid conflicting evidence or ideas, people will 
tend to devalue evidence that undermines their ex ante choice. See generally Chris Ann 
Dickerson, Ruth Thibodeau, Elliot Aronson, & Dayna Miller, Using Cognitive Dissonance to 
Encourage Water Conservation, in The Social Animal 277, 278–79 (Elliot Aronson ed., 7th 
ed., 1995). 
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in time and effort. Consumers’ evaluation of SFCs is distorted and their 
willingness to read the contract and act on what they find is undermined. 
Although the proponents and opponents of the NIA sharply differ in 
their understanding of the dynamics leading to SFCs formation, both 
focus their attention on an ex ante analysis. Both approaches examine 
what consumers will do during the time of contract formation. We be-
lieve that this focus neglects to acknowledge an important point in time 
at which consumers are much more likely to negotiate for alteration or 
read SFCs, namely ex post.42  
Consumers might read and examine SFCs after the contract’s forma-
tion with far more dedicated interest and attention than they did ex ante. 
As the next Part illustrates, shifting our focus to this ex post dynamic is 
crucial for properly examining SFCs in the online realm.  
II. Ex Post–Ex Ante Information Flow  
As mentioned, in B2C transactions, consumers do not read or cannot 
correctly evaluate SFCs prior to and at the time of their formation.43 Ar-
guably, this allows vendors to structure biased contractual terms. 
Information streaming to the market from consumers who read SFCs ex 
post could mitigate this problem. Consumers advised of biased terms 
might refrain from contracting with specific vendors, should such con-
tracting lead to inefficient outcomes. This information flow would stop 
vendors from including biased and unfair provisions in their SFCs to 
begin with, to avoid the loss of consumers.44  
In the following paragraphs we explain the meaning, elements of, 
and challenges to such data flow, at three crucial “chokepoints”: (1) The 
point at which the contract is viewed ex post; (2) the flow of information 
concerning the contract from the ex post to the ex ante consumer; and (3) 
the ex ante consumer’s use of and reliance on such information.  
                                                                                                                      
 42. Several scholars do mention this issue, yet without drawing out the various distinc-
tions we address throughout this Article. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 15, at 977; Johnston, 
supra note 12. For a study that examines actual consumers’ contracting behavior with respect 
to reading SFCs ex ante and ex post, see Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and 
Reality in Consumer Contracting Behavior (work in progress, on file with authors), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1117422. 
 43. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1151, 1163 (1976).  
 44. Again, the previously mentioned calculus applies: should the benefits to the firm 
from the use of unfair provisions exceed the damages and detriments stemming from the us-
age of such language, the firm will continue to make use of these provisions.  
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A. The First Chokepoint: Reading Ex post  
First, we must establish why and in which instances consumers re-
view SFCs ex post. The key to this interaction involves identifying 
instances in which the vendors’ actions do not meet the consumers’ ex-
pectations; the product was not what the vendor represented it to be, it 
arrived late or damaged, it malfunctioned, and the like. In such cases, the 
consumer might feel aggrieved, and search for proper responses. Some 
aggrieved consumers (or their lawyers) might examine the SFC they 
originally formed with the vendor to acquaint themselves with their 
rights and obligations. Others will contact the relevant vendor, complain, 
and demand recourse. Thereafter, vendors will frequently advise the con-
sumers of their rights, or lack thereof, referring to the relevant SFC. In 
response, consumers might examine the SFC, and contemplate their next 
steps. These and other behavioral patterns indicate that consumers have 
strong incentives to examine SFCs ex post.45  
Consumers often learn of the actual content of their contracts acci-
dentally. In these cases, disputes over contractual terms and conditions 
are viewed and understood by consumers in the abstract, without them 
realizing that the genuine source of such disputes is a standardized pro-
vision. For an example in the context of travel, after tickets are 
purchased, at times it is difficult or expensive to change trip dates. Con-
sumers are not likely to fully realize that the issue is an SFC provision 
that allocates risks among the contracting parties. Yet these disappointed 
consumers complain about the carrier’s “lack of flexibility,” “unfair-
ness,” or “lousy customer service.” Customers do not associate the 
problem with a standardized term they supposedly agreed to when pur-
chasing the ticket. Nevertheless, their criticism pertains directly to 
specific contractual provisions.  
Most of the reasons for the lack of effective reading and comprehen-
sion of “non-salient” terms ex ante do not apply to the ex post context. 
For instance, L&E NIA opponents explain that the costs of regularly re-
viewing SFCs ex ante will deter almost all consumers from reading them 
at all, given the heavy burden such reading would impose. Ex post read-
ing calls for a different cost/benefit analysis, which would foster such 
reading as the risks and problems related to the SFC have already mate-
rialized.  
The different dynamics that lead to ex post reading of SFCs also si-
lence several concerns voiced by the Behavioral L&E school of thought. 
Ex post, consumers are not prone to many of the cognitive errors and 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Cf. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 933, 938 (2006) 
(noting that “legal terms [of SFCs] matter only when something goes wrong”).  
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biases mentioned, as they can assess accurately and easily the risks and 
benefits of reading and understanding the SFC at that juncture. Also, 
since the breach or dispute has already occurred (and the risk has be-
come manifest), consumers should have no difficulty diverting attention 
to “non-salient” provisions and understanding their importance. The so-
cial setting and environment at the ex post point of time will differ 
substantially from the ex ante setting. By now the pressure from the ven-
dors has subsided, and consumers can thoroughly review the SFC. 
Our assertion that consumers will read and understand SFCs ex post 
is not clear of doubts. Arguably, in some instances, even at the ex post 
stage, a cost/benefit analysis might lead consumers to conclude that 
reading the SFC is inefficient. They may reach this conclusion after con-
sidering the heavy financial, attention, emotional, and social costs the 
interactions with the vendor and potential litigation might incur.46 This 
conclusion would be further borne out when the low probability of re-
ceiving any subsequent benefits from the vending firms at the end of the 
process is considered.  
We acknowledge that, in many instances, ex post reading is not 
likely to take place. We submit, however, that the effective reading and 
reviewing (and as mentioned above, the merely “experiencing”) of B2C 
SFCs ex post far exceeds the reading of such contracts ex ante.47 In addi-
tion, following the NIA assertions, and as we will explain below, a 
limited number of ex post readers might suffice to deter vendors from 
drafting biased SFCs.  
B. The Second Chokepoint: Ex Post–Ex Ante Flow of Information 
Establishing that some consumers review SFCs with caution and 
care ex post gets us only a third of the way through. The most basic con-
cepts of contract law and theory identify the moment of contract 
formation as the crucial juncture at which the parties establish their re-
spective rights and obligations. Consumers’ late recognition of flaws in 
contracts they previously entered into will not change the terms of the 
contract between the parties. Most importantly, late recognition of biased 
terms will not change the vendors’ actions vis-à-vis other consumers—
unless the information concerning the transaction48 flows from the ag-
grieved consumer to the ex ante consumers contemplating a transaction 
                                                                                                                      
 46. These costs might include, for instance, the costs of finding and accessing the SFC 
at this later stage. We address these points infra Part V.  
 47. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 42 (providing data that supports this asser-
tion). 
 48. This ex post information might vary. For instance, it could deal with the actual 
contractual provisions, or the vendor’s actions when relying upon the contract. 
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with the same vendor. We now identify and address five typical ways of 
information flow.  
1. Repeat Customers49 
Information will flow from a consumer reviewing the SFC ex post to 
the one confronted with it ex ante when these two consumers merge into 
the same person.50 However, to minimize this information flow, vendors 
strive to identify returning customers51 and provide them with preferable 
treatment.52 This could indeed mean better contractual terms, or a more 
lenient form of “interpretation” of such terms when conflicts arise.53 
Clearly, these strategies can neutralize this form of data flow.  
2. Mass Media Reports 
This flow occurs when the vendors’ actions toward the aggrieved (or 
satisfied) consumers, which reflect the contents of the SFC, are trans-
formed into a “story” reported by the mass media.54 Once reported, the 
information regarding the SFC reaches some prospective ex ante con-
sumers, thus assisting them in their ex ante considerations and 
negotiations with the vendor.  
This information flow suffers severe limitations. Stories of imbal-
anced contractual provisions rarely engage the mass media, which must 
tailor their content to meet a broad audience with a limited attention span 
in a very competitive setting. Aggrieved ex post consumers might find 
their story “hard to sell” to the mass media, given their general interest 
in sensationalism.  
                                                                                                                      
 49. For a reference to the claim that repeat players serve as a regulatory force, see Ami-
tai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1179, 1193 (2003).  
 50. This means that such flows occur in markets that feature returning customers. See 
Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 6, at 67 (mentioning the flow from ex post to ex ante 
consumers with regard to returning consumers and addressing other somewhat similar in-
stances of information flow).  
 51. Vendors do this for various reasons, such as providing customers with preferable 
treatment to ensure that they return. 
 52. Johnston, supra note 12, at 881 (arguing that firms should have discretion at the 
“forgiveness” stage, i.e., ex post, to seek out “good customers”).  
 53. See supra text accompanying note 17.  
 54. Watchdog groups, governmental sources, and consumer organizations also produce 
and distribute valuable information for prospective consumers. However, the most efficient 
way for such groups and organizations to reach the general public is via mass media (as dis-
cussed in the text) or the Internet. See infra text accompanying notes 180–182.  
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3. Vendors’ “Brand” 
A more subtle means of flow is through the vendors’ “brand.”55 This 
amorphous notion is a key element in today’s world of mass marketing, 
and will capsulate the available information about a specific vendor. As 
information about the terms of a specific firm’s SFC seeps into society 
ex post, it affects the firm’s brand.  
To confront this third form of information flow, vendors strive to 
control the purity of their brand. They do so by avoiding extremely nega-
tive exposure and refrain from using conspicuously biased provisions 
that might be easily discovered. They also expend a great amount of 
funds and effort into brand promotion through the media and other ad-
vertising avenues. These powerful messages will probably dwarf any 
adverse information stemming from the few aggrieved consumers who 
found lopsided terms in the fine print. 
4. Geographical Locations 
Information can flow from ex post consumers to prospective ones at 
specific and strategic geographical locations. Such geographical loca-
tions may be the vendor’s place of business or points of public 
congregation. Aggrieved consumers might congregate to complain there, 
meeting other potential consumers who may be curious about the infor-
mation revealed by the experienced (and now dissatisfied) consumers.  
To battle this type of information flow, vendors try to limit the geo-
graphical interaction between consumers in the ex post and ex ante 
stages by the use of architecture.56 Vendors separate these groups by dis-
tancing their respective points of interaction with the firm. Vendors also 
try to silence the most vocal disgruntled consumers (and data transferred 
from them) by providing them with a relief.  
5. Social Networks 
Information can flow through informal and social channels of data 
distribution such as family, friends, and neighbors. It can even flow 
among strangers, who happen to share these consumers’ interests and 
experiences.  
Nevertheless, these forms of information flows are limited by several 
constraints.57 For them to succeed, the ex ante consumer must interact 
                                                                                                                      
 55. Some scholars address this flow in terms of the firms’ “reputation.” See, e.g., Avi-
ram, supra note 49, at 1193.  
 56. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 127–28 (providing references to regulation through 
architecture in both the offline and online realm).  
 57. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Chal-
lenges of Online Reputation Systems, 49 Mgmt. Sci. 1407–22 (2003).  
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with another individual who is an ex post consumer, knows about the 
relevant vendor’s SFC, and belongs to the consumer’s social or profes-
sional circle. These limitations substantially decrease the chances that 
such interactions will transpire. The two ways in which such a flow 
could be initiated should also be considered. First, it could be initiated 
by the ex post consumer, who chooses to convey his or her discontent 
with a specific vendor’s SFCs to peers and friends.58 For this to happen, 
the ex ante consumer must remember the relevant information when fac-
ing a similar transaction. Second, this flow of information might be 
initiated by the ex ante consumer, who signals his or her interest in the 
information to others in order to receive the information sought. This 
action generates time and attention costs for both the contacting and con-
tacted party, which substantially limits such flows.  
Of course, these obstacles do not stop such flows from occasionally 
occurring. We all consult friends and family before engaging in (usually 
substantial) purchases. We also make mental notes about not purchasing 
products from specific vendors our friends complain of, as well as com-
plain about unsuccessful transactions in our social circle. But our pool of 
contacts is obviously limited. Moreover, the time and attention-
demanding costs of seeking out, gathering, and remembering this infor-
mation further impede the chances of relevant information reaching the 
ex ante consumer.59 This fifth form of information has the potential to 
pose a serious challenge for vendors, and they have few tools to hamper 
its effectiveness. However, as this form of flow is usually limited and 
sporadic, it will usually not create a serious threat from the vendors’ per-
spective.  
C. The Third Chokepoint: Internalization of Information 
by the Ex Ante Consumer 
In the last stretch of the information flow, the relevant information 
on problematic SFCs provisions reaches prospective consumers who 
meet the vendor and his SFC ex ante. This circumstance raises difficult 
questions as to whether consumers will pay attention to information 
streaming from other (ex post) consumers. Arguably, this information 
will again be neglected as it refers to events unlikely to occur and usu-
ally considered non-salient.  
                                                                                                                      
 58. Below we address the various incentives and motivations for the ex post consumer 
actually to convey this information in such a context.  
 59. Thus, the cheaper the product, the weaker the incentive to seek feedback from in-
formal contacts is. Accordingly, such information flows will hardly exist in many retail 
markets. 
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However, we believe such information will be acknowledged and 
considered by ex ante consumers. The costs of considering such data 
should be substantially lower than directly confronting the SFC terms, 
which are usually cloaked in heavy legalese. The information will also 
reflect actual events that have taken place, and will therefore seem sali-
ent, and much more relevant, to the prospective consumer. So although 
this information flow meets many obstacles, the discussion below exem-
plifies that the online realm holds great promise for its success.60  
III. Ex post–Ex ante Information Flows in the  
Online Realm 
In this Part we examine whether the ex post-ex ante information 
flow discussed above will be enhanced, or possibly abated, in the online 
setting. In doing so, we take into account recent technological tools and 
social trends the Internet brings into play. Our analysis addresses each of 
the three “chokepoints” of the ex post–ex ante information flow ad-
dressed above.  
A. The First Chokepoint: Reviewing Online SFC Ex post 
Our analysis of the review of B2C SFCs at the ex post stage ad-
dresses two categorical differences between the online and the offline 
realm: the costs of obtaining the SFC for an ex post review and the po-
tential benefits of and motivations for such reading.61 
1. Costs  
Assessing the costs of obtaining SFCs by ex post consumers online 
and offline applies contrasting arguments. Online, ex post SFCs review 
should increase. When online B2C consumers are aggrieved they face 
fewer difficulties and costs in locating and reading the relevant SFC. 
Consumers can presumably locate and access such contracts on the rele-
vant online vendors’ website with ease. This is somewhat contrary to the 
offline setting, in which consumers might have misplaced or discarded 
the original SFC since the time of purchase. 
On the other hand, the online setting presents opportunities for ven-
dors to render finding the relevant SFC ex post quite tedious, by placing 
                                                                                                                      
 60. This dynamic does not substitute the one described by the NIA above, but supple-
ments it by providing additional market dynamics. Their combination is clearly more likely to 
succeed in deterring SFCs drafters from incorporating one-sided provisions than mere reliance 
on the offline Marginal Consumers.  
 61. As this subject is generally poor in empirical data, much of our analysis rests on 
assumptions; we hope to assemble empirical evidence and studies in the future. 
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the link to the SFC at a hidden “location” in the vendor’s website. Ven-
dors might even make such contracts inaccessible to non-purchasing 
consumers or after purchase. We make no attempt to draw a clear con-
clusion on these competing arguments, but assume that both results are 
possible. Later in our analysis, we take this matter into account and offer 
policy recommendations based on vendors’ conduct at this juncture.  
2. Benefits and Motivations  
On the face of it, examining the online realm leads to the conclusion 
that consumers will be less inclined to review SFCs ex post. They might 
assume that receiving recourse is unlikely given the nature of e-
commerce, as many e-commerce vendors are physically remote and 
might be hard to contact.62 In addition, the relatively low prices that 
characterize many online transactions might create an inherent assump-
tion that e-commerce markets and dynamics present greater adherence to 
the common law “caveat emptor” principle. Therefore, consumers will 
be willing to accept various shortcomings in this setting, and refrain 
from consulting their SFCs. 
To our mind, the perception of the limited benefits and obstacles that 
stem from presenting challenges to existing e-commerce transactions 
will probably diminish over time. As online transactions become more 
popular and users become more accustomed to online contracting and 
transactions, consumers will recognize the potential benefits of reading 
the SFC and using the knowledge it conveys. They will not be intimi-
dated by the remoteness of the vendor, or the remote chances of success 
in pursuing their rights by the way of online grievances.  
In sum, this first chokepoint of the ex post–ex ante information flow 
shows several differences between online and offline B2C SFCs ex post 
reading. Considering the strong incentives to read SFCs ex post in gen-
eral, e-commerce should still provide ample opportunities and 
motivations to review SFCs ex post. 
B. The Second Chokepoint: Information Flow  
Here we address the five forms of information flow we introduced 
above, while concentrating on those that are greatly affected by the shift 
to the online realm. This shift makes the ex post–ex ante data flow a real-
ity. 
                                                                                                                      
 62. They might only provide an email address rather than a phone number that allows 
for a discussion with a “real” person.  
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1. Repeat Customers 
As mentioned,63 the impact of repeat players on the overall flow 
seems minimal. To establish whether online markets should lead to a 
different result, we must examine several elements that might affect such 
flow. These are the percentage and market share of returning customers; 
the ability to identify (ex ante) consumers most likely to return, and the 
ability to provide these consumers with preferable treatment (ex post), 
thus removing them from the general pool of consumers.64  
It is somewhat early to establish which trends (regarding repeating 
customers) will dominate the online market, and speculations lead to 
mixed conclusions. In terms of the market power of returning consumers 
in the e-commerce market, the great variety of online commercial web-
sites and platforms might point to a smaller market share made up of 
consumers returning to any firm. However, recent concentration in 
online markets might indicate otherwise.65 In addition, online marketers 
devote large funds and much attention to customer-retention initiatives, 
and construct their interfaces so as to make returning consumers feel at 
home, thus increasing the number and market share of repeat custom-
ers.
66
  
An analysis of the second (i.e., the ability to identify, ex ante, return-
ing customers) and third (the ability to perform ex post discrimination) 
elements mentioned provides mixed results as well. The Internet allows 
effective tracking of online activity through the use of cookies and other 
devices.67 The information thereby accumulated is analyzed, and used to 
identify returning consumers. The Internet’s one-to-one interface facili-
tates customized interactions with these consumers, allowing e-
marketers to neutralize the “protective” role returning consumers might 
have on the overall market. On the other hand, in the online realm, users 
can make use of various means68 to shield their identity and interact 
anonymously.69 Online data analyses and direct marketing initiatives 
                                                                                                                      
 63. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 64. We refer to these dynamics as consumer discrimination, and differentiate the dis-
crimination of ex post and ex ante consumers. See supra note 17.  
 65. See supra note 8.  
 66. Applications such as name recognition, one-click payments and customized rec-
ommendations are a few techniques provided by Amazon.com.  
 67. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, in 
Consumer Protection in the Age of the “Information Economy” 379 (Jane K. Winn 
ed., 2006). 
 68. Many of the applications mentioned above can be neutralized quite easily by eras-
ing all cookies, setting a high security level on the user’s browser, and setting up bogus email 
addresses.  
 69. Yet these means require knowledge or sophistication which not all users have. In 
the online privacy context this reality is referred to as the “Blinking Twelve” problem. See 
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might also prove imprecise in comparison with offline practices.70 In 
sum, this aspect of the analysis has yet to demonstrate a clear distinction 
between the online and the offline business settings.  
2. Mass Media  
The second strain of information flow consists of information con-
veyed to ex ante consumers through various forms of the mass media. 
Earlier we explained that in the offline world the effects of this data flow 
would be minimal given the structure and interests of the mass media. 
Online, however, mass media are supplemented by additional data flows. 
Of the various outlets the Internet medium provides, we demonstrate the 
potential changes in information flows online in this context in respect of 
blogs.71  
Blogs, a personal webpage that can be updated frequently and easily, 
have sprung up throughout the web in great numbers. Millions of these 
applications address an enormous variety of topics. The great majority of 
blogs have no intention to appeal to the masses and do not usually rely 
on commercial advertisers for financial backing (although some do bene-
fit from a lucrative income from online advertisements posted 
throughout their blog).72 They frequently address niche audiences and 
subtopics. Given these characteristics, blogs create an ideal setting to 
convey information regarding problematic contractual provisions.73 Since 
the blogosphere is extremely diverse, it seems unlikely for commercial 
firms to successfully block or even counter the information that blogs 
convey. Blogs allow bloggers to deliver information to their readers, but 
most of these platforms allow user feedback as well, which creates even 
more opportunities for conveying information regarding SFCs. 
                                                                                                                      
Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-
Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 743, 754 (2000).  
 70. In the online realm, existing tracking practices tend to group users of the same 
computer (through the use of cookies, which track every computer as an individual “user” 
even though the same machine hosts different individuals), while failing to trace one user 
making use of several machines (although the use of login names to various sites, which are 
allocated to each specific individual, potentially resolves this concern). 
 71. Blogs (short for web logs) are considered one of the icons of the Web 2.0 age. 
However, blogs are merely one example of an online application that permits dissemination of 
information in the online realm. Other applications, such as RSS feeds and P2P networks, are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 72. See infra note 155.  
 73. Clearly, this issue calls for an empirical study. A brief pretest conducted by our 
research assistant, found somewhat limited references to these issues on blogs, especially 
popular ones. These results are considered in our analysis of this issue below. Nir Farber, 
Tracking Online References to Non-Salient Contractual Provisions, (May 2007) (unpublished 
research study, on file with authors). 
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The emergence of the blogosphere has been recently discussed by 
several scholars in the context of its implications for free speech, auton-
omy and democracy.74 Blogs facilitate the promotion of diversity of both 
content and ownership in the media. To our mind, in addition to the ef-
fects blogging has on the democratic discourse, it may have a significant 
impact on the world of commerce as well.75  
The mere existence of blogs is insufficient if these are not read.76 Re-
cent studies indicate that although the blogosphere is vast, the number of 
users reviewing blogs is relatively small.77 We believe, and studies indi-
cate,78 that this is a transient state. Blogs are becoming more popular and 
central as time passes. Blog postings and the information they convey 
are also prominently presented by search engines in their search results. 
The increased intake of information by such alternative media sources 
can inform ex ante consumers of unfair and imbalanced contractual pro-
visions, and allow them to act accordingly.  
3. Vendors’ “Brand” 
The third form of data flow concerns contamination and dilution of 
the e-commerce vendors’ brand as a result of biased contractual provi-
sions. We have yet to establish whether these specific brands are more 
resilient or vulnerable to ex post–ex ante data flows. Commentators ad-
dressing these issues state conflicting arguments.79 Generally, several 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Yochai Benkler, for instance, refers to blogs as tools that can reverse the problems 
of concentration and commercialization that afflicts today’s media markets. Yochai Benkler, 
The Wealth of Networks 216 (2006).  
 75. This potential has not been left unnoticed. See Jean Braucher, New Basics, in Con-
sumer Protection in the Age of the “Information Economy,” supra note 67, at 185 
(“with public online availability of terms, journalist and bloggers can publicize bad terms and 
get the word out to more customers in a manner that is more readable than the usual standard 
form.”).  
 76. One might also argue that blogs and other online forms of information distribution 
are mere conduits, or “pipes,” which distribute the content gathered, formulated and edited by 
the “old” mass media. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democ-
racy, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 839, 896 (2002); see also Robert McChesney, The Problem of the 
Media 118, 220 (2004). According to this school of thought, the existence of online media 
outlets will merely echo the (sparse) information on SFCs conveyed by conventional media. 
Reality, nonetheless, has constantly proved this assertion wrong. Whereas some bloggers 
merely post and link to other stories, others have been constructive in bringing forth new ideas 
and stories authored by a great variety of people, acting on a diversity of motivation. See 
Benkler, supra note 74, at 221. 
 77. And thus might not meet the NIA model requirements. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 23–25. Though the numbers are constantly rising, it is currently estimated that 39% 
of online users read blogs. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, Internet Activities Re-
port (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/Internet_Activities_1.11.07.htm. 
 78. Id. 
 79. On the one hand, there are stronger incentives to protect one’s brand in new and 
competing markets. On the other hand, firms might forgo their attempts to protect their brand 
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studies and anecdotal evidence indicate the ease with which public opin-
ion could turn against players in the online arena in the event of 
misconduct, privacy breaches, or other unpopular steps.80 Yet it is unclear 
whether we can infer from these instances to those which pertain to non-
salient terms in the vendor’s SFC.  
4. Geographic Locations 
At first glance this category seems irrelevant to our discussion. The 
online realm does not feature geographical points of gathering and con-
gregation. E-commerce vendors might frequently refrain from providing 
an actual address for complaints, and those available to the public might 
be of remote warehouses and well guarded corporate headquarters. The 
lack of such geographical locations in the online realm should greatly 
reduce this ex post–ex ante information flow. However, geographic loca-
tions are supplemented by “virtual” ones. These include the vendor’s 
website, as well as other websites where ex post consumers congregate 
and exchange information.  
At first, the prospects for data flows at virtual points of congregation 
seem bleak as well. As in the “real” world, vendors will strive to silence 
the information flow at these venues and make use of the website’s ar-
chitecture to minimize criticizing voices. Vendors can construct their 
websites so as not to provide applications and tools for information shar-
ing, or deny the publication of all negative remarks within its 
boundaries.81 Still, some e-commerce websites do provide for such hubs 
of unfettered exchange of ideas and opinions within the confines of their 
website.82 Evidently, these applications would allow for an efficient and 
fertile flow of ex post–ex ante information.  
Moreover, the geographical points of congregation at which ex post–
ex ante information can flow are not limited to those within the confines 
                                                                                                                      
in order to generate a profit in a very competitive market. For a discussion of this matter in the 
broader context of online vendors’ “reputation,” see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 
469–70, 475.  
 80. See generally, Laura Gurak, Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace: The 
Online Protests over Lotus Marketplace and the Clipper Chip (1997).  
 81. These silencing attempts are undoubtedly extremely effective online. The digital 
realm allows structuring the webpage in specific ways without this architectural framework 
being apparent to the users, and facilitates the implementing of frequent changes in the web-
site’s structure to meet these objectives. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 38–60 (discussing 
“Architectures of Control”).  
 82. For instance, Amazon.com and eBay.com allow various forms of information ex-
change regarding products and services. In some instances (recorded on file with the authors) 
these exchanges include direct criticism of the hosting websites and their practices. Nir Farber, 
Analysis of Comments on Large Vending Website (May 2007) (unpublished research survey, 
on file with authors) (reporting some of these exchanges).  
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of the vendors’ property. “Virtual” space might not have “sidewalks,”83 
yet users constantly interact with these ex post consumers online at vir-
tual points of congregation—such as message boards and open forums.84 
These online applications are frequently devoted to various vendors or 
the services and products they provide. Recent studies indicate85 that ex 
ante consumers flock to these points of congregation before concluding 
(or even start negotiating) their online transaction. Within these forums 
the vendors’ ability to silence unwanted statements is limited, and the 
minimal costs of speech allow ex post consumers to voice their opinion 
cheaply and freely. 
A possible impediment to the success of these data flows is that (in 
most cases) they rely on the ex ante consumers’ knowledge of these ex-
isting hubs of information. As opposed to “real space,” these points of 
congregation are not physically apparent. However, users encounter dis-
gruntled consumers or other consumers with information regarding the 
online transaction en route to the vendors’ website through the use of 
search engines. When using a search engine, online consumers typing in 
the name of the e-commerce vendor or relevant keywords, will receive 
search results indicating the existence of other websites, forums, or chat 
rooms devoted to the discussion (and at times criticism) of these vendors 
and products. Thus, consumers can quickly acknowledge the existence 
of relevant “geographical” locations in the online realm. 
Before proceeding, we must address several reservations regarding 
the success of this form of “geographic” data flow. First, not all users 
will be exposed to this important information source. Some might not 
know of these points of congregation, and will not be part of the inciden-
tal encounters mentioned, as there are other means to reach vendors’ 
websites besides the use of search engines (such as navigating to the site 
directly from another one or through a hyperlink).86 However, according 
to recent surveys, the vast majority of online surfers use search engines 
as an information gathering tool.87 Second, vendors constantly strive to 
limit the online interaction between prospective consumers and ag-
grieved customers. To do so, they apply trademark law and other legal 
                                                                                                                      
 83. See Beth Simone Noveck, Democracy of Groups, 10(11) First Monday (2005), 
nn.140–45 and accompanying text. See also Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 189 (1999) (dis-
cussing possible ways to overcome this problem while referring to Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in 
Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 149 (1998)).  
 84. For instance, those provided by epinion.com, cnet.com and many others.  
 85. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 77. 
 86. Therefore, they might not be aware of the vibrant discussion addressing the relevant 
vendor just a click away on message boards or various forums. 
 87. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 77 (providing that 91% of 
users turn to search engines to find information).  
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doctrines88 to block the sale of domain names bearing similar names to 
their own. In addition, they strive to limit the sale of their brand name as 
a keyword, which would facilitate the selection and presentation of com-
peting and adverse sponsored links near their own, on search engine 
result pages. At times, they also attempt to silence criticizing voices by 
threatening to sue the speaker and the forum which hosts her. We address 
the steps and the legal doctrines they rely upon, in our policy discussion 
below.  
5. Social Networks89 
This fifth mode of ex post–ex ante flow constitutes the greatest 
change and challenge of the online realm. It could potentially lead to 
significant rewriting of the online B2C SFCs doctrines. The Internet pro-
vides novel platforms that generate social ties of various strengths. It 
facilitates the construction of communities in which users can both seek 
out knowledge and provide responses, while minimizing time and atten-
tion constraints. It also allows the quick retrieval of information 
previously conveyed within these circles. To explain the effects of these 
platforms, we address the technological and social changes that are 
bringing about their great success, and the way they affect the ex post–ex 
ante flow.  
This segment of our analysis focuses on a specific set of online tools 
and interactions, frequently referred to as “social software” or “social 
networks.”90 These applications create communities with ties of varying 
strengths, which sometimes are limited in size, and most importantly, 
generate a communal feeling among their users. We do not cover other 
online tools that facilitate active exchanges among users, such as open 
message boards, talk-back features and various other tools that allow 
online social interactions. The reason for this exclusion is twofold. First, 
we addressed these in our discussion of the second (news and media–
with regard to blogs) and fourth (geographical locations) forms of data 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See infra Part V.C.2.  
 89. In this Article, we suggest one analytical path to overcome the great variety of tech-
nologies and social interactions that are emerging in today’s information society and 
promoting data flows. In our attempt to manage this variety, we utilize a taxonomy premised 
on existing technologies and business models. Recent scholarship, however, considers several 
other taxonomies describing these new dynamics. For an interesting and applicable taxonomy 
addressing these issues while distinguishing close, intermediary, and loose-knit ties, see Lior 
J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 359 (2003). 
 90. These terms are quite loosely defined, and might include a broad variety of applica-
tions. For a definition of this dynamic, see Benkler supra note 74, at 373 (quoting Clay 
Shirky). For a discussion of this term, see Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and 
Law, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 153, 158 (2006); Noveck, supra note 83, at nn.20–30.  
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flow. Second, these applications raise serious questions concerning the 
accreditation of the speakers in these forums (which we discuss below).91 
In many open message boards, for example, almost any user can voice 
her opinion anonymously. Yet in this segment our discussion focuses on 
applications which provide a constant profile for users. They also serve 
as tools that allow users to vouch for and accredit others, and in that way, 
promote the creation of a stable community.92 Clearly, however, the line 
between these applications is blurring. Creators of sites, that were mere 
points of congregation in the past, are now striving to transform them 
into communities with ties of diverse strengths.  
(a) Technology 
The technological platforms facilitating online social networks 
vary.93 Social networks originally emerged through the use of the very 
first applications the Internet introduced, such as IRC (Internet Relay 
Chat),94 discussion boards, forums, and mailing lists. With time, these 
tools have been improved to include additional features allowing ac-
creditation of contributors, as well as incentives to motivate 
contributions to the ongoing discourse. These tools (such as Wikis)95 are 
commonly referred to as “Social Software”96 and allow users to form a 
community and engage in ongoing debates, as well as in various and 
elaborate group projects.97  
                                                                                                                      
 91. But see Lior J. Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving” For Everyone (and Everything?), 
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1699, 1733–34 (2006). Strahilevitz explains that if these forums and sites 
provide a great deal of feedback, sorting out the false feedback (both deliberate and uninten-
tional) should be possible. We address this issue below, but note that in this specific context, 
large quantities of feedback might not be available. In addition, the incentives to provide false 
information are quite substantial.  
 92. Clearly the nature of the vouching function is important. As Benkler notes, popular 
social networking sites such as Friendster and MySpace offer vouching in terms of indicating 
the user is a “friend.” However, this dichotomy of friend/not friend proves too thin to nurture a 
sustainable accreditation system. See Benkler, supra note 74, at 368. 
 93. See Noveck, supra note 83, at n.115 and accompanying text (discussing the emer-
gence of relevant technologies that facilitate the discussed networks).  
 94. See Answers.com, IRC: Definition and Much More from Answers.com, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/internet-relay-chat (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (defining and 
describing the application). 
 95. See Answers.com, wiki: Definition and Much More from Answers.com, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/wiki (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 96. See Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Political Groups, Shirky.com., March 9, 
2003, http://www.shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html. 
 97. For an in-depth analysis of these projects (such as Wikipedia and Slashdot), see 
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369 
(2002). 
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These platforms are provided by a variety of entities. Often they are 
formed by popular portals,98 commercial firms with interests in the rele-
vant field,99 search engines that refer users to relevant discussions on the 
basis of keywords,100 and other for-profit and not-for-profit entities (such 
as Facebook.com and MySpace.com). These relatively simple platforms 
greatly benefit from the Internet’s general traits: international accessibil-
ity at all times and low costs, as well as the extremely low cost of storing 
the histories of ongoing conversations. Recent improvements in search 
technologies provide quick and simple retrieval of these exchanges by 
users who were not part of these discussions. 
(b) Society: From the World Lonely Web to Web 2.0 
A successful and substantial information flow requires a social inter-
action that takes advantage of the tools at hand. The online potential for 
an active social interaction is apparently now being realized.  
Observations and predictions in the early days of the Internet stated 
that this medium leads to social isolation and solitude.101 This line of so-
cial commentary viewed online users as lonely individuals facing their 
computer screens. As these users are completely immersed in their 
online activities, they refrain from going out into the “real” world.102  
Yet, with time, the Internet medium proved to be very different. It al-
lowed users to interact, rather than passively consume content in 
solitude.103 Thus, social commentators began exploring the social side of 
                                                                                                                      
 98. Yahoo! (Yahoo Groups) and Google (such as Google Groups) include several plat-
forms for the formation of such a discourse.  
 99. See e.g., Carspace.com, CarSpace Automotive Forums, http://www.carspace.com/ 
csGroups (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (Automotive forums for vehicle information, provided by 
Edmunds). 
 100. According to Clive Thompson, this is a practice in China and a service provided by 
Baidu. Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 23, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html?_r 
=1&scp=2&sq=google%27s+china+problem&st=nyt&oref=slogin. 
 101. See Benkler, supra note 74, at 356, 360; Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone—
The Collapse and Revival of American Community, 176 (2000) (noting that besides the 
promise of communications in this realm, they generate many problems as they lack social 
cues and therefore cannot generate trust). This issue was recently revisited in a report by the 
Pew Internet & American Life Project. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, The 
Strength of Internet Ties 2 (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Internet_ties.pdf. 
 102. This line of thought continued (and to a certain degree echoed) previous work re-
garding the televised medium which seems to isolate its viewers and contribute to the demise 
of social interaction in today’s society. See Putnam, supra note 101, at 283. 
 103. Studies have also shown that the rise in Internet use has mostly been at the expense 
of hours and attention previously devoted to watching television. See, e.g., Pew Internet & 
American Life Project, supra note 101, at 3.  
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the online interaction.104 These latter trends of thought grew more popu-
lar beginning in the late 1990s, as websites such as Amazon.com and 
eBay made use of applications that facilitate social networks to promote 
data flows concerning various vendors and products.105 In the last few 
years, these technological applications and social trends have moved to 
the front line of the celebrated Internet traits and features. Sites that cre-
ate social networks, such as YouTube, MySpace, Facebook and 
Friendster, lead the various ratings of popular websites,106 and in some 
cases, were purchased for many millions by leading media firms.107 In 
response to these trends and developments, technologists have declared 
the birth of “Web 2.0”: A new online generation dominated by the above 
applications, and a social dynamic that relies on constant contributions 
from and interaction with the masses.108 In keeping with this trend, Time 
Magazine voted “You,” the individual interacting, conversing, and com-
menting online, as “Person of the Year” for 2006, thus cementing 
recognition of the Internet as a realm of fruitful and ongoing social inter-
actions.109  
Even in view of these developments, there is still no clear answer as 
to how these changes impact human relations.110 Many argue that “Web 
2.0” is merely a buzz term, promoted for marketing purposes, and does 
not reflect an actual shift in online user conduct and behavior.111 None-
theless, those pointing to a novel and important social phenomenon 
arising online make a forceful argument. The Internet allows users to 
maintain existing strong social ties, as well as create and maintain 
weaker ties among business associates and individuals with mutual in-
                                                                                                                      
 104. Turkle, for instance, pointed out that the Internet promotes social interactions of a 
different kind. See Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen 263 (1997) (explaining that the 
Internet provides additional freedom). 
 105. Two instances are Amazon Reviews and eBay’s Feedback system.  
 106. See e.g., Alexa Traffic Rankings, http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?cc= 
US&ts_mode=country&lang=none (last visited on April 15, 2007) (showing several “Web 
2.0” websites in leading positions—excluding the search engines that dominate the list and 
that might be considered such sites as well—with youtube.com ranked fourth, myspace.com 
ranked fifth, and wikipedia.org ranked eleventh).  
 107. See BBC News, News Corp in $580m Internet Buy (July 19, 2005), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4695495.stm (reporting the News Corp. purchase of MySpace,); 
Jim Hu, Yahoo Buys Photo-Sharing Site Flickr, CNET News.com, Mar. 20, 2005, 
http://www.news.com/Yahoo-buys-photo-sharing-site-Flickr/2100-1038_3-5627640.html 
(reporting the Yahoo! Purchase of Flckr); Paul R. La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for 
$1.65 Billion, CNNMoney.com, Oct. 9, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/ 
googleyoutube_deal/ (reporting the Google purchase of YouTube). 
 108. See Dvorak, supra note 4.  
 109. Lev Grossman, Time’s Person of the Year: You, Time, Dec. 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html. 
 110. Or as Benkler concludes, “the effects of the Internet on social relations are obvi-
ously complex.” Benkler, supra note 74, at 357.  
 111. See Dvorak, supra note 4. 
ZARSKY BECHER ITP 4_C.DOC 5/9/2008  11:33 AM 
Spring 2008] E-Contract Doctrine 2.0 331 
 
terests.112 These social changes profoundly affect our political and social 
discourse. In addition, and as we argue in this Article, they affect com-
mercial practices as well.113 The creation and strengthening of these 
social networks facilitates the transfer of information about contractual 
terms from ex post to ex ante consumers, thereby potentially limiting the 
role courts and legislators should play regarding SFCs.  
(c) Online Ties and Ex Post–Ex Ante Information Flow 
Exchanges within social networks generate a fruitful flow of relevant 
information and the online realm enhances such flows in various ways 
and contexts. First, online applications serve to strengthen existing ties 
among family and friends, even when residing at distant locations. The 
above flows are reinforced by the lowering of the costs of connecting 
with members of one’s close social circle, regardless of geographical 
distance. This close social circle will prove a reliable source of informa-
tion about various vendors and their contracting practices.114  
The impact on “strong ties” and the flows across them are but a lim-
ited contribution by the Internet to the realm of social networking and its 
implications to online commerce. “Weak ties”115 formulated online make 
the major difference to the issues here addressed, clustering around spe-
cific topics such as professions, hobbies, issues of interest, personal traits 
and even geographical locations. These social networks are an ideal set-
ting for ex post–ex ante flows.  
An online social networking site devoted to discussions of the intri-
cacies of specific SFCs might not generate a great deal of interest,116 but 
issues related to SFCs arise casually in a variety of other settings in so-
cial networks that address the consumption of products and services.117 In 
addition, in social networks that are not focused on specific themes re-
lated to commerce, but on simple friendship or common interests, users 
might “float” questions about upcoming purchases among other  
                                                                                                                      
 112. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 101. 
 113. We focus on applications that promote interactions taking place online only. Other 
tools are focused on moving the online discourse offline as well. See, e.g., Meetup, 
http://www.meetup.com. For a discussion of this issue, see Benkler, supra note 74, at 368. 
For a powerful endorsement of these dynamics, see Putnam, supra note 101, at 410–11.  
 114. Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 101. 
 115. Benkler, supra note 74, at 368; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 89. 
 116. For instance, a site discussing the “Hilton” hotels’ standardized and allegedly bi-
ased terms was viewed only by a very few hundreds of surfers. See EULA Library, 
http://www.gripewiki.com/index.php/EULA_Library (last visited July 15, 2007).  
 117. For instance, in the process of discussing the purchase of products and services 
related to the issue at hand (be them musical instruments in one context or car parts in an-
other) ex post consumers could pass on information about a vendor’s conduct, which often 
reflects its SFC.  
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community members, and will probably receive meaningful insights 
from them.118 As noted,119 it is very common for consumers to discuss 
various aspects of their SFCs, without realizing they are in fact address-
ing standardized terms.  
A possible critique of the effectiveness of this form of information 
flow is that the limited number of users engaged in information ex-
changes in these social networks is insufficient120 to deter imbalanced 
contracting.121 While the number of users who participate in social net-
works is vast and constantly growing, they still constitute a small 
percentage of all online users, let alone overall consumers.122 Only a very 
limited number of consumers contemplating an online transaction with a 
specific vendor are members of the community in which information 
about the true nature of the vendor’s SFC is exchanged. According to 
this argument, the number of users exposed to this form of data flow 
might not suffice to meet the stated objective of deterring SFCs drafters 
to employ biased contract terms.  
Several responses to this criticism are possible. First, according to 
the L&E model discussed above123 a relatively small percentage of edu-
cated and informed consumers might deter vendors from providing one-
sided terms. More importantly, the circle of ex ante consumers receiving 
information as a result of this dynamic need not be confined to devoted 
members of online social networks. Information produced within the 
network can be quickly and effectively reached by outsiders as well. 
                                                                                                                      
 118. Recent empirical studies indicate that such practices take place. See Pew Internet 
& American Life Project, supra note 101, at 37. 
 119. See supra text following note 45.  
 120. Another possible critique might argue that in this context, we are affording a great 
amount of influence to individuals who dominate social networks. In addition, these individu-
als might have a different set of preferences than the general public. We plan to address these 
thorny questions in future work.  
 121. The problem and the critique run deeper, as even in these social networks only a 
small proportion of the users actively contribute content to the online discourse. For instance, 
Wikipedia is the product of a social network, but in the ratio of viewers to actual contributors 
the percentage of the latter is very small. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia 152 (2006). 
In other social networks, such as YouTube or Flickr, the percentage of contributing users is 
smaller still. Only 0.2% of visits to YouTube involve users uploading a video, 0.16% of Flickr 
visits are people posting photos, and 4.56% of visits to Wikipedia result in content-editing. 
See Bill Tancer, Who’s Really Participating In Web 2.0?, Time, Apr. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1614751,00.html. The response to this 
additional aspect of the critique is similar to the one posted in the text, as even this limited 
amount of participation is sometimes sufficient to generate content that will deter firms from 
providing imbalanced contractual provisions.  
 122. According to recent empirical evidence gathered by the Pew Institute, 78% of 
online users research a product or service before purchase, yet only 16% report using an 
online social network site such as MySpace or Friendster. See Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, supra note 77. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
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Many social networks allow non-members to view ongoing discussions 
and earlier posts.124 Several networks allow the content of their discus-
sions to be indexed by specific or general search applications, allowing 
outsiders easily to find relevant discussion threads. According to recent 
surveys, many consumers indeed flock to these online social networks 
(via search engines) when seeking information about relevant online 
vendors, prior to finalizing transactions.125  
6. Challenges to Online Information Flows 
The expansion of the circle of participants in the online information 
flow intensifies several difficulties: How will “outsiders” know how 
much weight to assign to information received from parties they encoun-
ter for the first time? Can this information be tampered with or 
manipulated by interested parties, and thereby rendered incorrect and 
biased? In addition, one must inquire why ex post consumers contribute 
and assist other consumers (some of whom visit the relevant network 
website only that one time) with online advice without receiving any 
apparent benefit or compensation. These are problems of Accreditation 
and Motivation, which we now address. 
(a) Accreditation 
“Accreditation” refers to information indicating whether the relevant 
online speakers are knowledgeable, reliable, trustworthy, and unbiased. 
Without accreditation, many of the noted information flows will falter 
over time. The need for accreditation, which exists in all walks of life, is 
magnified online:126 online, anonymous communications are wide-
spread;127 the Internet presents users with an abundance of sources, 
opinions, and information, mostly from previously unknown speakers; 
and in this setting, many online interactions are non-recurring. There-
fore, online users need tools to establish the dependability of the relevant 
data and data source.  
Several challenges to the information flows concerning consumer 
products and services arise. First, there are concerns regarding “forum 
accreditation,” i.e., the risk that the content reviewed might be  
                                                                                                                      
 124. For various reasons, some social networks strictly guard the content of ongoing 
discussions within the site against outsiders (such as mailing lists on the one hand and Face-
book.com on the other).  
 125. As mentioned, according to the Pew Report, 78% of consumers research products 
prior to purchase, and 91% (the highest percentage use of any application) make use of search 
engines to find information. Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 77. 
 126. For a discussion of accreditation in the context of the marketplace of ideas, see 
Benkler, supra note 74, at 169–74, 183–84. 
 127. Lessig, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
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compromised by its online host. The entities controlling the relevant ap-
plication (blogs, posting boards, or social networks) might censor128 or 
alter messages that they find harmful to specific vendors for various 
commercial reasons. Below we examine which applications and flows 
are more susceptible to these concerns, and the steps that might be taken 
to mitigate them. Although this issue poses a serious challenge, we be-
lieve that users are learning to identify and distrust suspicious and 
unreliable forums.129  
The online realm also raises the concern that the actual speaker is 
unreliable. First, the speaker might be incompetent, and therefore, pro-
vide inaccurate or unsubstantiated advice.130 The online society is 
learning to deal with this challenge in various ways. Users can quickly 
join in and correct the initial user’s mistakes or grade the relevant re-
mark, generating a social dynamic sometimes called “folksonomy.”131 
Users logging onto the relevant information source will be able to bal-
ance this remark with other, correcting comments and additional 
consumer feedback.132 Various online tools allow users to grade com-
ments made by the same user in the past,133 and post a calculated factor 
of this grade beside newer comments posted by the same user. As these 
solutions seem to produce satisfactory results in other online settings,134 
we assume that this aspect of the accreditation problem could be sub-
stantially solved in the context of retail and consumer-related 
information as well.135  
Overall, several rules-of-thumb could be formulated to establish the 
accuracy of content flowing in various online forums. For instance, the 
                                                                                                                      
 128. While censorship does not yield false or misleading data, it will create a wrong and 
biased impression for the consumer who is searching for the overall picture of a particular 
issue.  
 129. The fear of knowledge of such conduct reaching users will encourage these forums 
not to intervene in this way.  
 130. The web, as many point out, is replete with mistakes and nonsense. See, e.g., Sun-
stein, supra note 121, at 186–87. 
 131. For further discussion on “folksonomies,” see Tal Z. Zarsky, Assessing Alternative 
Models Compensating for Content Consumption, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 645, 709 (2006). 
 132. This, of course, does not help the consumer faced with a limited number of “fresh” 
comments, who would probably be wise to wait. Wikipedia is an excellent example of a dy-
namic of self correction of mistakes by other users at a later time. See Sunstein, supra note 
121, at 154.  
 133. For example, Slashdot provides contributors with Karma points and eBay employs 
a sophisticated feedback system. For a discussion of Slashdot, see Benkler, supra note 74, at 
78.  
 134. A recent study showed that Wikipedia, an encyclopedia generated by a collaborative 
effort that is susceptible to the errors of incompetent contributors, is as accurate as Encyclope-
dia Britannica. See Benkler, supra note 74, at 70–73; see also Sunstein, supra note 121, at 
151.  
 135. See Zarsky, supra note 131. 
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size and maturity of the community involved would be reliable proxies 
for the quality of advice and information it provides.136 We will return to 
this issue when we discuss policy recommendations below.  
Consumer information online might also be flawed and inaccurate 
because of actual malice.137 Users intentionally give incorrect informa-
tion because of their commercial interests.138 For instance, firms might 
take advantage of the anonymity of the Internet and instruct employees 
to roam it and intervene in various online exchanges in order to promote 
the firm’s interests (or they may outsource this task to consultants).139 
These actions would prove to be an acute problem140 that presents serious 
challenges.141 
The measures mentioned to protect accreditation can be of some use 
in battling actual malice as well. Fellow users can assist in flagging ma-
licious sources and content. Yet this might be insufficient, given 
commercial parties’ strong incentives to perpetrate these problematic 
schemes.142 We return to this matter when we discuss specific forms of 
information flows.143  
                                                                                                                      
 136. Shirky argues that the success of some communities such as Slashdot or Wikipedia 
in delivering high level content should not be indicative of the specific mechanisms they use 
for content quality control. Such success is the result of the several years these services have 
been in practice, which have created a process of decision making fine-tuned by the commu-
nity members. See Clay Shirky, Group as User: Flaming and the Design of Social Software, 
Nov. 5, 2004 www.shirky.com/writings/group_user.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 137. In the context of social networks, these actions are now referred to as “crowd hack-
ing.”  
 138. This occurs in the political realm as well. In the U.S., it has been argued that sena-
tors have been praising and bashing each other by manipulating the Wikipedia entries of each 
other. Matthew Davis, Congress ‘made Wikipedia changes’, BBC News, Feb. 9, 2006, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4695376.stm. 
 139. These actions will resemble those taken in other online contexts, such as search 
engine ranking, where firms optimize search results by linking to their website from a variety 
of locations. See Zarsky, supra note 131, at 686; see also James Grimmelmann, The Structure 
of Search Engine Law, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 10 (2007). 
 140. For a recent discussion of these concerns, see Annalee Newitz, Herding the Mob, 
Wired, Mar. 2007 available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.03/herding.html; An-
nalee Newitz, I Bought Votes on Digg, Wired, Mar. 1, 2007 available at http:// 
www.wired.com/techbiz/people/news/2007/03/72832 [hereinafter Newitz, Votes on Digg].  
 141. Chyrsanthos Dellarocas, Reputation Mechanisms, in Handbook on Information 
Systems and Economics 629, 643–44 (T. Hendershott ed., 2006), available at 
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/cdell/papers/elsevierchapter.pdf.  
 142. Commercial parties have created such schemes by setting up bogus accounts that 
promote the specific speaker, who strategically praises or demonizes various products and 
services, with commercial interests in mind.  
 143. See infra Part III.B.6.c.  
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(b) Motivation 
Empirical findings as well as anecdotal evidence indicate that con-
sumers’ motivation to contribute to online social networks exists. Studies 
show a high percentage of consumer participation in reviewing products 
and leaving messages in a broad variety of settings.144 Moreover, these 
studies show constant growth in online participation.  
Yet even after taking these findings into account one must ask why 
people devote time and attention to providing information about prod-
ucts (and related contractual aspects) for the use of strangers.145 A 
possible explanation is a mix of different internal incentives. On the one 
hand, consumers act out of spite146 and vengeance against a vendor that 
has crossed them. On the other hand, users provide feedback out of altru-
ism and while exercising their freedom of expression.147 In addition, 
some consumers provide valuable information incidentally, when merely 
seeking help and assistance from others (regarding the best way to han-
dle problematic SFCs and vendors).148 These motivations are enhanced 
online, where the costs of “speaking” and reaching an extremely broad 
public are particularly low.  
New commercial players constantly enter the market for “social 
networks” and rely on consumer feedback to generate content, value, 
and eventually profits.149 These entities seek novel ways to enhance the 
flow and quality of information that the public provides. To achieve this, 
they offer prizes and other forms of external compensation to promote 
                                                                                                                      
 144. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 77 (indicating that 22% of 
Internet users participate in an online discussion and 19% create content for the Internet).  
 145. A simple answer might be that the reasons need not matter (or might be an interest-
ing question for sociologists, as opposed to legal and public policy scholars). What should 
matter for the analysis at hand are the actual trends of user participation. We believe that this 
response is insufficient. Policy recommendations, which are meant to influence a slowly 
changing legal system, must be premised on a sound understanding of why these effects tran-
spire, and accordingly determine whether they will prove sustainable in the future. Such 
information is also required to predict what affects motivation to participate in online ex-
changes.  
 146. Spite can go a long way as a motivator online. According to some commentators, 
spite and hatred of Microsoft are among the key elements that motivated many thousands of 
computer programmers to collaborate and create the Linux Kernel. See Thomas L. Friedman, 
The World is Flat 98–99 (2005). For more on spite, see Strahilevitz, supra note 91, at 1713.  
 147. Sunstein mentions a mix of these forms of incentives: some are committed to inno-
vation, others enjoy the process, while yet others are pure altruists. Users might also carry out 
these tasks for approval or glory. Sunstein, supra note 121, at 174, 205.  
 148. A study conducted by our research assistant indeed found several instances in 
which such information was conveyed. Nir Farber, supra note 73. 
 149. Many new innovative business models are now premised on these sources of labor. 
Popular websites such as YouTube, Flckr, Digg.com, Del.icio.us rely on information and con-
tent generated by consumers in a bottom-up process. See Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth Without 
Markets, 116 Yale L. J. 1472, 1502–03 (2007). 
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this form of participation.150 More time is needed before it can be deter-
mined if these new strategies are successful.  
(c) Application: Blogs, Message Boards, and Social Networks 
The foregoing discussion established the meaning and importance of 
accreditation and motivation in the general online context. We now apply 
these elements to three key applications which facilitate online consumer 
participation.  
(i) Blogs 
Blogs play an important role in the second form of information 
flows, as a supplement to the mass media.151 However, the abundance of 
blogs creates a severe problem of accreditation. Users might rely on a 
misleading and unreliable source, or lose themselves in the clutter of 
voices.152 Yet users find ways around these difficulties. First they learn to 
rely on specific blogs that have won their trust or that of their acquaint-
ances.
153
 In addition,154 technological measures (such as Technorati.com 
and other blog-oriented search engines) point users toward blog entries 
that have been selected by many other users—a rough proxy for the 
credibility of the blog’s content.155  
In terms of motivation, blogs are a classic example of expression 
primarily motivated by intrinsic incentives.156 Therefore, bloggers might 
                                                                                                                      
 150. For instance, MetaCafe.com (social network website) introduced an elaborate “Pro-
ducer Award” Program. See Metacafe, http://www.metacafe.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
YouTube has also granted awards to the most-viewed files. See Virginia Heffernan, Screens: 
YouTube Awards the Top of its Heap, NY Times, March 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/arts/27tube.html?fta=y.  
 151. See sources cited supra note 76.  
 152. Sunstein, supra note 121, at 187, harshly criticizes blogs, stating that in many 
cases they are inaccurate, error-ridden, and uncorrected when a mistake is revealed. Moreover, 
he argues, blogs might create “information cocoons” as users will turn to them to strengthen 
their pre-existing opinions.  
 153. Recent research indeed indicates that although there are millions of blogs, users 
tend to only concentrate on a few. See Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality, Feb. 8, 
2003, http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html. This trust could indeed be 
misplaced, as occasional reports surface on a prominent blogger “selling out” and promoting 
corporate interests. See Jon Fine, Polluting the Blogosphere, BusinessWeek, July 10, 2006, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_28/b3992034.htm. Yet, such 
concerns pertain to the mass media as well. 
 154. See Lessig, supra note 3, at 243–44. 
 155. Another question of accreditation could arise regarding content posted by other 
users within the blog. However, as these forms of web pages tend to be closely moderated by 
one or a few individuals, the risk of gaming and manipulation through posting to these sites is 
substantially reduced. 
 156. However, bloggers sometimes reap considerable profit from advertising through 
their pages. See Ben Arnoldy, Bloggers Can Make Money, but Most Keep Day Jobs, The 
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be motivated to address SFCs they themselves encountered as ex post 
consumers.
157
 Such blogging would not be that common, however, and 
will be dispersed among the millions of online blogs. Moreover, often 
the blogger’s motivation might not be the same as that required for the 
task this Article addresses. Most bloggers seem to address political or 
government-related issues and matters in the news, and therefore shy 
away from questions of imbalanced non-salient SFCs. In other instances 
bloggers focus on personal issues, aiming to connect with friends and 
family.158 Therefore, blogs might prove a problematic source for ex ante 
consumers. 
(ii) Message Boards and Points of Congregation 
The Internet creates many points of congregation, where consumers 
flock to discuss various aspects of products and services. These sites 
present a promise for fruitful exchanges and ex post–ex ante information 
flows. Still, severe problems in terms of accreditation and motivation 
arise.  
First, regarding accreditation; when such sites are operated by com-
mercial entities there is ongoing concern that the operating entities will 
use the site to promote various commercial interests (problems of “fo-
rum accreditation”). Furthermore, many of these sites allow users to 
leave comments “on the fly” and without registering as a user (and thus 
creating a stable and identifiable online persona). While existing tools, 
such as “folksonomies,” help users decide whether the information is 
accurate and helpful, they are still subject to possible manipulations by 
interested parties who hide behind a veil of anonymity.159 This concern is 
exacerbated given the digital traits of the Internet, which would allow 
                                                                                                                      
Christian Scientist Monitor, Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ 
0205/p01s03-ussc.html. 
 157. According to a recent study, 78% of bloggers are inspired by personal experiences 
in their posts. Pew Internet & American Life Project, Bloggers: A Portrait of the 
Internet’s New Storytellers 9 (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
PPF/r/186/report_display.asp. 
 158. These statements might seem contradictory, but according to a recent study, they 
address the two faces of blogging. It showed that 60% of bloggers blog to keep in touch with 
family, and 37% mostly address their personal lives. The second most popular topic is politics 
and government (11%); business affairs rank much lower in popularity. For a more detailed 
discussion, see id.  
 159. Many of these forums have recently begun introducing various accreditation sys-
tems that indicate returning users in order to maintain their accreditation among the users’ 
eyes. Adopting these applications somewhat constitutes the evolvement of this forum into a 
community or a social network, and therefore it is treated as such in our analysis. 
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automated “bots” to bombard these forums with self-interested mes-
sages.160 
These forms of information flow meet several challenges in terms of 
motivation as well. Although users would be inclined to participate, 
whether out of spite or altruism, they might hesitate because of the “free 
riding” problem, which allows many others to benefit from their efforts 
without reaping any benefit. Genuine comments might be drowned in 
self-interested ones from vendors and their representatives. Several 
online vendors strive to overcome these problems by encouraging users 
to provide feedback, either through compensation161 or simply by end-
lessly nagging them.162 It is unclear whether these steps prove fruitful.  
Although these online points of congregation might have some 
shortcomings, many commercial entities are well aware of these difficul-
ties and strive to minimize them. One strategy is to turn these sites into 
loose-knit (though very large) communities of users and consumers. We 
now consider these social dynamics.163  
(iii) Social Networks 
Information distributed through these networks shows the most 
promise of overcoming the obstacles of accreditation and motivation. In 
terms of forum accreditation, these realms are usually maintained by 
external entities devoted to the neutral operation of this network. When 
this is not the case, the “repeat players” and active community members 
closely monitor the actions of the operators and complain if they suspect 
“foul play.” Several traits of these communities allow other accreditation 
concerns to be overcome as well. This is achieved by introducing various 
tools for accreditation of both content and speaker, as well as publication 
of the histories of the returning players and the grades they received in 
the past. These tools and applications allow even once-only visitors to 
quickly establish the merit of comments and recommendations available 
throughout this network.  
                                                                                                                      
 160. To battle these bots, websites have devoted resources to develop CAPTCHAs—
automated Turing tests set in place to assure that only humans can make use of these applica-
tions. For the various difficulties involving the usage of CAPTCHAs, see CAPTCHA: 
Information and Much More from Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/captcha (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 161. However, as Benkler explains in the context of peer production and the open source 
movement, providing external incentives in settings dominated by altruistic contributions 
might prove counterproductive. Benkler, supra note 74, at 94–95. 
 162. This was the personal experience of one of the authors with both Amazon and eBay.  
 163. eBay, for instance, strives to brand interactions among users as interactions within 
the eBay “community.” This is in an attempt to overcome troubles of accreditation and moti-
vation.  
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Crucial elements of such networks insulate these communications 
from manipulation and malicious actions of interested parties as well. 
Since these realms include many returning players, anonymous posts 
made by interested parties will probably be ignored. Sophisticated and 
persistent commercial entities might strive slowly to build a credible pro-
file in these realms, and thereafter provide biased content. Yet there is a 
good chance that other repeat players will identify these bad intentions 
and “flag” such a user as problematic and unreliable.164 Finally, as these 
networks are populated by repeat players who invest a great deal of time 
and energy in constructing their online reputation, they might be reluc-
tant to risk their integrity by conforming to corporate objectives.165  
In terms of motivation, these realms provide additional dimensions 
to those mentioned above. Users are motivated to participate in the 
online discourse given their affiliation and sense of belonging to the 
online community. Recent studies indicate that consumers’ motivation to 
contribute is reinforced when information on other community members 
is available.166 Also, as they might expect to receive information from 
other repeat players in the community, users contribute out of reciproc-
ity.167  
The above aspects of social networks have rendered them fertile 
platforms for peer production and joint projects. They also turn these 
social realms into an environment that furnishes a sustainable ex post–ex 
ante information flow. As the popularity of such networks constantly 
grow, the existence of this dynamic mandates rethinking the legal treat-
ment of online SFCs.  
C. The Third Chokepoint: Internalizing Information Ex Ante 
Even though additional data flows are materializing online, their 
mere existence might have no impact. For various reasons, ex ante con-
sumers might choose to ignore (or not seek) the important information at 
                                                                                                                      
 164. For examples of these dynamics, see Newitz, Votes on Digg, supra note 140. 
 165. Several troubling instances indicate otherwise. According to news reports, one 
recent case took place in the folksonomy Digg.com. See Dan Mitchell, What’s Online—
Stuffing the Electronic Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/technology/23online.html. With regard to the proactive 
role law might be required to take regarding these matters, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online 
Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated Information 
Flows, 18 Fordham Intel. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 741, 781 (2008) (indicating that such 
steps are already seriously contemplated in the UK, such as anti-sock puppet legislation).  
 166. See Chris Forman, Anindya Ghose, & Batia Wiesenfeld, Examining the Relation-
ship Between Reviews and Sales: The Role of Reviewer Identity Disclosure in Electronic 
Markets, Information Systems Research, 19 Info. Sys. Res. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript 
at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918978. 
 167. See id. at 9–11. 
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their fingertips. We return to these and others issues in Part V below, 
where we apply our analysis of the ex post–ex ante information flow to a 
concrete discussion of contractual terms in B2C transactions.  
IV. Online B2C Contracts: Reassessing the NIA 
A. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Analysis of Online 
SFC—Resolving Differences 
In this Part, we examine whether the NIA can be applied in the 
online context while relying upon our previous insights regarding the ex 
post–ex ante of information concerning B2C SFCs. After applying the 
economic and behavioral critiques of the NIA to the online setting, we 
conclude that this flow strengthens the NIA in specific situations, thus 
leading to important policy implications.  
First, an important caveat is due. Throughout the analysis, we treat 
as equal the outcome of Marginal Consumers reviewing SFCs ex ante 
and other instances in which Marginal Consumers act on information 
flowing from ex post consumers. Nevertheless, these two instances differ 
substantially. In the former, consumers react to the actual provisions of 
the SFC; in the latter, consumers (and then the markets) react to the ven-
dors’ conduct and other consumers’ feedback which are premised on the 
SFC. The difference between these instances arises when vendors set 
imbalanced provisions in their SFCs yet fail to act (or act very rarely) on 
them. In such a case the existence of these provisions will not be re-
flected in the ex post–ex ante data flow. Therefore, at first blush, 
implementing policy recommendations on the basis of promoting and 
relying on the latter data flow will probably not deter vendors from in-
cluding imbalanced provisions, which they rarely enforce, in their SFCs.  
Vendors have several incentives to include imbalanced provisions 
they do not insist upon in their SFCs. First, such provisions can enhance 
firms’ reputations. When aggrieved consumers turn to vendors for relief, 
they will first refer them to the relevant (yet imbalanced) contractual 
provision, and then inform their customers that the vendors’ consumer-
friendly policy is to forgo their contractual rights. Second, the mere in-
clusion of such provisions has a “chilling” effect on a significant 
segment of consumer complainers. These aggrieved consumers will re-
frain from taking various actions against the vendor on learning of their 
limited entitlements according to the SFC they previously accepted.168 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contracts Sche-
mas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ 
Propensity to Sue, 15 Behav. Sci. & L. 83, 92–93 (1997). This resembles, in a way, the dis-
cussion above on ex post discrimination. See also infra text accompanying notes 195–200. 
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Third, in acting this way, vendors prepare themselves for a “doomsday” 
scenario in which extreme circumstances (such as a massive recall or a 
colossal malfunction in their product) would require them to exercise 
their rights according to the imbalanced provisions.169  
Online information flow will minimize two of these three incentives, 
and thus limit the problematic outcomes of imbalanced yet rarely en-
forced contractual provisions. Vendors will be less inclined to include 
imbalanced provisions in their contracts for the first (“enhancing reputa-
tion”) and second (“chilling aggrieved consumers”) reasons. This is 
because the online realm facilitates yet another information flow, that 
among ex post consumers themselves. This flow allows experienced 
consumers to learn easily of the ways vendors treat and interact with 
others. With this additional flow in place, a vendor will be hard pressed 
to manipulate consumers into believing that it is providing them with 
preferable treatment. In the online setting, consumers can easily find out 
that they are not receiving any preferable treatment from the vendor 
when it “graciously” decides to depart from the strict provisions of its 
SFC. Similarly, when taking into account the ex post–ex post informa-
tion flow, the “chilling effect” mentioned might diminish as well. When 
consumers can easily learn that vendors comply with consumers’ re-
quests even though they are not required to do so according to the 
relevant SFC, they need not be intimidated by the actual language of the 
SFC. With such information at hand, consumers will feel more confident 
to demand more consumer-friendly treatment from the vendor.  
The third incentive mentioned (preparation for a “doomsday sce-
nario”) cannot be resolved by the data flows addressed throughout this 
Article. Still, it could be mitigated by some of the specific regulatory 
interventions we consider below.170 In sum, although exclusive reliance 
on the ex post–ex ante information flow might not provide all the bene-
fits of ex ante review of SFCs, these lost benefits are not substantial in 
the online realm, and could be restored by specific regulatory steps.  
                                                                                                                      
 169. In the meantime they risk only minimal reputation damage, as very few consumers 
actually read and internalize SFCs ex ante. Some academics further argue that vendors might 
draft one-sided agreements yet enforce them only against opportunistic buyers who exploit 
market asymmetries that disadvantage firms. See e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 7, at 828 
(explaining that “the seller’s right to stand on the contract as written will protect it against 
opportunistic buyers” where occasional consumers might not have any reputation concerns); 
Gillette, supra note 15, at 977 (opining that sellers are “more likely . . . to enforce ostensibly 
oppressive terms only in the face of serious buyer misbehavior”). Interestingly, if this is indeed 
the case, information flows which include references to the consumers’ and firms’ behavior 
along the lines suggested by Bebchuk & Posner will strengthen the positive outcomes of such 
behavior patterns. Such a flow will deter consumers from behaving opportunistically and 
encourage firms to treat good-faith customers fairly, regardless of previously incorporated 
one-sided terms.  
 170. See infra Part V. 
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B. Taking SFCs Online  
Agreements executed online are drafted by one commercial party: 
the website operator. Most online SFCs terms are rarely (if ever) open to 
negotiation.171 Furthermore, while offline consumers can complain to the 
vendor’s local agents, online users are arguably confronted with a 
harsher reality: the e-vendor’s automated interface seems to leave no 
room for any expression of discontent.172 Online standard form contract-
ing has led to a flurry of reactions. Legislators have set consumer 
protection rules which regulate the online SFCs.173 At the same time, 
courts have been called to decide whether online consumer contracts are 
binding and whether their imbalanced provisions might be revoked.174 
Academia too has been grappling with what policy should be imple-
mented regarding online SFCs,175 a matter we now discuss. 
1. The NIA Online 
The NIA submits that when market forces are properly aligned, 
SFCs will prove balanced and will provide an efficient allocation of risks 
and obligations. This rationale holds for online contracting as well. Fear-
ing the loss of Marginal Consumers in the online competitive B2C 
setting, sellers are expected to draft balanced SFCs. The NIA also fits 
quite neatly into broader notions of Internet policy doctrine. Since the 
advent of the Internet, many have argued for treating this realm as bor-
derless and order-less. Commentators maintain that regulation in this 
context will slow the net’s innovation, as technology will quickly out-
grow legal rules.176 Furthermore, they assert that rules will prove 
ineffective as online firms defy geographical borders.177 Regardless of the 
                                                                                                                      
 171. As stated earlier, several SFCs terms are typically left blank, such as price, quantity, 
and time and means of delivery. Online, some vendors allow contractual flexibility on more 
provisions, such as warranties (especially in the retail sale of electronics). See supra note 16. 
 172. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 468. Yet some websites do provide 
means for consumer feedback. See infra Part IV.B.2.e.  
 173. See, e.g., Jane Winn & Brian Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting 
in the US and the EU, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175 (2006). 
 174. See supra notes 10–11.  
 175. For instance, some academics propose that regulators should require online vendors 
to present clearly SFC terms on their websites prior to contract formation, and include specific 
captions and details in these documents. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 491; 
Morningiello, supra note 10, at 1347.  
 176. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Feb. 8, 
1996, http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. For a discussion of this issue, see 
Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Bor-
derless World 20–22 (2006).  
 177. David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1379–80 (1996). See also Lessig, supra note 3, at 300–01 (discussing, 
and disagreeing with, this notion).  
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accuracy and validity of these arguments,178 they represent a powerful 
notion that matches the NIA’s discontent with governmental and judicial 
intervention. The analytical foundations and prerequisites of the NIA are 
also a perfect fit with the Internet market realm. Online B2C markets 
prove extremely competitive given the relatively low barriers to entry.179 
Furthermore, Marginal Consumers can (arguably) easily review the rele-
vant SFC prior to the transaction. Vendors will accordingly tailor their 
SFCs in a balanced manner, possibly leaving little cause for legal inter-
vention.  
The online realm also strengthens the NIA by providing Marginal 
Consumers with two additional sources of information on the SFCs: (1) 
ex post consumers, and (2) watchdog groups. The ease of accessing 
these sources will potentially broaden the Marginal Consumers group, 
and further deter vendors from providing imbalanced SFCs.  
We devote the following sections to the ex post–ex ante flow of in-
formation online, after we briefly consider the weight and merit of 
information streaming from watchdog groups in the online context. In-
deed, the Internet might help ex ante consumers by providing them with 
easy access to information collected by self-appointed or governmental 
watchdog groups. These groups will closely scrutinize SFCs of popular 
vendors, and voice their opinions as to the content and fairness of these 
contracts. The Internet provides a valuable mechanism for checking gov-
ernment branches by dispensing news and commentary on their actions, 
something hardly possible yesteryear.180 Arguably, these principles can 
apply to commerce as well, and consumers can have access to an abun-
dance of consumer reports.181 Blogs, social networks, search engines, and 
other means of online information distribution could provide users with 
access to information streaming from these sources about possible flaws 
and imbalances in SFCs. However, relying on watchdog groups to gen-
erate market dynamics that would protect consumers from one-sided 
contractual terms is a problematic notion. The success of online watch-
dog groups in the political arena might not easily translate to similar 
success in the realm of commerce and B2C transactions.182 Therefore, we 
leave this issue for future exploration and discussion.  
                                                                                                                      
 178. See generally Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 176. 
 179. See supra text accompanying note 8.  
 180. For several examples, see Benkler, supra note 74, Ch. 7.  
 181. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclo-
sure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 852 (2006) (referring to several 
such successful ventures, some run by the EFF).  
 182. Skeptic readers might raise several valid questions as to whether watchdog groups 
will prove a reliable, stable, and substantial source of information online. In the offline world, 
few relevant reports on the issue of provisions of standard form contracts are produced, and 
even fewer are actually read by the general public. Even when such reports are produced, they 
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To summarize, the online realm creates market conditions and in-
formation flows that may allow market forces to assure balanced SFCs. 
Yet, as we mentioned,183 the NIA has been criticized from various doc-
trinal perspectives. We now study these critiques as applied online, 
focusing on information flowing from ex post consumers. 
2. The NIA Online: Law & Economic Challenges and Responses  
In the following paragraphs, we discuss critiques of the NIA in the 
online context from the L&E school of thought. We refer to arguments 
premised on (a) transaction costs, (b) uniformity of SFCs and free rider 
effects, (c) credence qualities, (d) the vendors’ misperception, and (e) the 
limited influence of Marginal Consumers and vendors’ ability to margin-
alize market pressures to provide balanced contractual provisions.  
(a) Transaction Costs 
A powerful challenge to the NIA states that even the Marginal Con-
sumer will find reading and evaluating SFCs inefficient. Consumers in 
the offline world reach this rational conclusion when considering the 
high transaction costs of this task, namely evaluating a long and complex 
SFC. Rational consumers will reach a similar conclusion online. Fur-
thermore, transaction costs online are bound to rise. Online users 
confront more contracts every day, and at every virtual juncture.184  
The NIA can provide strong responses to this critique in the online 
context, resorting to the additional data flow we emphasized above. Al-
though ex ante consumers encounter high costs when attempting to 
decipher SFCs online,185 they gain access to knowledge about these  
                                                                                                                      
tend to focus on outrageous behavior rather than mildly imbalanced contractual provisions. 
See id. There are several possible responses as to why matters will be different online. The 
Internet proves a fertile platform for content production. For instance, it can facilitate collabo-
rative projects in which thousands of volunteers work their way through extensive SFCs and 
provide online commentary for their segment, which is later compiled into an overall ranking 
that is open to the public. See Benkler, supra note 74, at 262 (discussing the role of blogs as 
watchdogs in the political context). On the other hand, the political sphere presumably pro-
vides greater motivation for public participation than the commercial realm, so the success of 
the online discourse about the former should not serve as an indication about the latter. Con-
sidering its complexity, we believe this issue raises serious questions that are beyond the scope 
of this Article.  
 183. See supra Part I.D.  
 184. On the other hand, it is possible that in the future, technological measures would 
assist in reviewing SFCs and identifying problematic clauses. For instance, JavaCool software 
has developed a tool (the “EULAlyzer”) which strives to meet this objective. See Javacool 
Software, EULAyzer, http://www.javacoolsoftware.com/eulalyzer.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2008). 
 185. However, one can argue that technologies can assist consumers in reviewing SFCs 
quickly and efficiently. Simple applications such as browser search buttons allow users to find 
quickly the provisions they seek. On the other hand, some commentators argue that reading 
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contracts through the ex post–ex ante data flow. Prospective consumers 
can learn of the traits of SFCs by searching and following blogs, mes-
sage boards and forums, and interacting in various social networks. This 
information need not be extensive or cloaked in legalese, as it is written 
by fellow consumers who want to get their point across as clearly as pos-
sible. Fellow users are expected to share their experience with 
contractual terms in simple and informal language (and, as mentioned 
above, sometimes not even noticing that they are raising matters covered 
in a standardized term).186  
Obviously, sifting through the various relevant snippets of data 
available online can be time consuming and even frustrating. However, 
tech-savvy users will form a new class of Marginal Consumers who 
master these tasks while avoiding the pitfalls of relying on non-
accredited and manipulated sources. Sometimes users will gather this 
information very cheaply, as they encounter data when interacting within 
their own online virtual communities. Mostly, however, they will en-
counter such information when using various search applications. These 
tools, as we explained above, will quickly and easily direct them to rele-
vant information after typing in relevant keywords or the brand name.187  
(b) Uniformity of SFCs and the Free Rider Problem 
NIA critics further argue that Marginal Consumers will refrain from 
reviewing SFCs as they will be motivated to leave this tedious task to 
others and try to “free ride” on their efforts. Ultimately this line of think-
ing will result in almost no consumers reviewing SFCs.188 Consumers 
will likewise refrain from examining their particular agreement, assum-
ing that other SFCs (of competing brands) are similar and their dreary 
task of reading and reviewing will be in vain.  
The ex post–ex ante information flows can mitigate these arguments 
as well. In terms of uniformity, with information streaming smoothly 
online from various ex post users, ex ante consumers have additional 
tools to establish whether or not SFCs are similar. With this information 
flow, consumers need not rely on intuition regarding uniformity, but on 
actual feedback they receive from consumers who have engaged in 
transactions premised on the agreements of various online vendors.189  
                                                                                                                      
SFCs off computer screens proves “hard on the eyes” and therefore constitutes an additional 
cost. Hillman, supra note 181.  
 186. See discussion following supra note 45.  
 187. For a discussion on the ease of searching online, see Gillette, supra note 15, at 977. 
 188. However, this critique is somewhat problematic as it ascribes consumers a great 
deal of sophistication, which they might not deserve.  
 189. The NIA provides a strong response, even when these information flows indicate 
uniformity among SFC. According to the NIA, actual uniformity in SFCs of different vendors 
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With regard to the “free riding” argument, we assert that as ex ante 
users are able to access information about SFCs easily from ex post con-
sumers, they are more likely to gather information about vendors 
themselves, rather than relying on others. As explained above, users 
might learn of such information incidentally, when searching for infor-
mation on the product in general,190 or even interacting with others in 
online social networks.  
(c) Credence Qualities 
Another critique of the NIA is that even Marginal Consumers are 
unable to comprehend, and then signal to vendors, that the SFC at hand 
is imbalanced and unfair. Many of the imbalanced contractual provisions 
refer to credence qualities, which are difficult to assess at the time of 
contract formation, as well as during performance.191 Even the most so-
phisticated consumers will concede to unbalanced contractual provisions 
in view of their inability to grasp and predict the future outcome of the 
agreement at hand.  
Consideration of the ex post–ex ante information flows diminishes 
this line of criticism. Although online ex ante consumers cannot assess 
credence qualities on the basis of the SFC alone, they are in a better po-
sition to do so with ample information streaming in from ex post 
consumers. These experienced consumers can report on remote risks that 
manifested later. With this information available, ex ante consumers can 
better assess terms usually categorized as credence qualities.192  
(d) Vendors’ Misperception 
Critics of the NIA further argue that even if Marginal Consumers re-
view the SFC and signal their disapproval of biased provisions, this 
signal will be disregarded by vendors. Vendors’ representatives have nei-
ther the motivation nor the opportunity to convey consumers’ discontent 
with the relevant SFC to the vendor’s management and legal depart-
ments. On the face of it, online reality strengthens the NIA  
                                                                                                                      
need not indicate a problem. Such uniformity can be explained by vendors reaching an accept-
able equilibrium, and offering fair and balanced provisions.  
 190. Recent evidence indicates that large numbers of consumers indeed engage in such 
searching and examination. See supra notes 122, 125. 
 191. See Meyerson, supra note 19, at 596–97.  
 192. We concede that not all credence qualities could be revealed through the ex post-ex 
ante information flow, as some problematic features may appear many years later. These is-
sues are usually dealt with through consumer protection laws. For a discussion on the EU 
approach to this matter, see Francesco Parisi, The Harmonization of Legal Warranties in 
European Law: An Economic Analysis, 52 Am. J. Comp. L., 403, 419 (Spring 2004).  
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critique. This realm leaves hardly any room for actual interaction be-
tween vendors and consumers.  
However, many e-commerce websites do facilitate consumer feed-
back, which may make its way directly to management. In the 
competitive e-commerce environment vendors have many incentives to 
structure their websites to afford access to this important feedback 
source. Furthermore, consumer feedback reaches management through 
the various forms of online content distribution and information flow 
mentioned. Anecdotal newspaper reports indicate several instances 
where vendors reacted directly to complaints posted on influential blogs 
and in social networks.193 Recent statements by business leaders indeed 
indicate194 an increased interest in information streaming through online 
forums, chat rooms and other virtual social gatherings. In sum, the 
online realm will lead to the removal of obstacles in the flow of relevant 
information to the vendors’ management. 
(e) Discriminating Among Different Groups of Consumers 
NIA critics argue that vendors can undermine the effects Marginal 
Consumers will have by identifying them and treating them differently. 
In doing so, vendors can provide sub-optimal SFCs and treatment to the 
majority of consumers, while not risking the loss of Marginal Consum-
ers. As explained, this form of “customer discrimination” could be 
carried out at two junctures: ex ante, when vendors provide sophisticated 
consumer with specific contractual terms that will meet their special re-
quest; and ex post, when vendors can “silence” complaining consumers 
with preferential treatment.195  
The online context brings interesting twists to this argument. On the 
surface, it provides a strong foundation for those critiquing the NIA. The 
Internet’s interface provides additional opportunities to narrowcast dif-
                                                                                                                      
 193. In recent instances, both negative (Dell) and positive (Toyota Prius) online feedback 
had a profound effect on brands. See Keith Schneider, Brands for the Chattering Masses, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 17, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/business/yourmoney/ 
17buzz.html. Marketing experts recommend that firms constantly review the blogosphere and 
discussion boards to seek out both positive and negative information. See Paul Gilber, Brand 
Protection in the Age of Customer Engagement, Wis. Tech. Network, Mar. 2, 2007, avail-
able at http://wistechnology.com/article.php?id=3742. Various firms, such as BuzzMetrics, 
engage in monitoring brands in these realms and act as intermediaries by forwarding these 
data (for a charge) to major vendors. See Schneider, supra. Companies also have their own 
corporate blogs and are interested in promoting various discussions by these means.  
 194. Comments along these lines were made at the 2007 World Economic Forum in 
Davos in the panel including the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and the CEO of Goldman 
Sachs. Similar comments were made by Scott Anderson, HP’s director of Enterprise Brand 
Communications. See Daniel Terdiman, Why Companies Monitor Blogs, CNET, Jan. 3, 2006, 
http://news.com.com/Why+companies+monitor+blogs/2100-1030_3-6006102.html. 
 195. See generally supra note 17; text accompanying note 34.  
ZARSKY BECHER ITP 4_C.DOC 5/9/2008  11:33 AM 
Spring 2008] E-Contract Doctrine 2.0 349 
 
ferent content to different consumers. By making use of the Internet’s 
“one-on-one” interface and relying on personal information previously 
collected, vendors can attempt to identify Marginal Consumers and pro-
vide them with preferable terms.196 They can extend special offers and 
contractual terms to some purchasers ex ante without the knowledge of 
others.197 They can also approach aggrieved consumers ex post and “si-
lence” them without other consumers knowing of such conduct.  
However, consideration of the ex post–ex ante information flows 
substantially weakens this critique. To isolate consumers who might be 
sensitive to imbalanced contractual provisions, vendors must also iden-
tify consumers who are likely to draw information from ex post 
consumers through the various online applications mentioned and use it 
when making various retail-related decisions. It seems almost implausi-
ble that vendors could construct a model to detect such users ex ante. In 
addition, the discriminatory practices mentioned above are extremely 
difficult and risky to implement online. Very few firms have engaged in 
discrimination of contractual terms in e-commerce, and the technologi-
cal challenges in attempting to do so are greater than technologists 
originally predicted.198 Even when such schemes were implemented,199 
firms suffered serious repercussions on their exposure, as news of these 
discriminatory practices spread quickly throughout the net.200  
3. The NIA Online: Addressing the Behavioral Critique 
The existence of the online ex post–ex ante information flow greatly 
influences the behavioral analysis of offline B2C SFCs. Here we focus on 
critiques addressing (a) information overload and consumers’ tendency to 
focus on salient attributes; (b) surrounding circumstances that impede 
consumers’ capabilities; (c) risk biases (especially over-confidence and 
over-optimism); and (d) consumers’ perception of self-commitment.  
                                                                                                                      
 196. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 472; Hillman, supra note 181, at 843 
(noting that at first glance, “because e-consumers can easily spread the word about the nature 
of the terms, the Internet should increase this incentive [to provide consumers with fair 
terms]”; yet realizing that e-technology facilitates ex ante discrimination in contractual terms). 
 197. For instance, online, e-commerce vendors provide specific forms of consumers with 
“special sales codes” that allow access to sales and reduced prices (a practice applied, for 
instance by Bestbuy.com and Amazon.com).  
 198. Since today’s technologies allow users to apply multiple identities and pseudonyms 
online, firm’s risk that these schemes will become evident quickly, and consumers will report 
them to their peers.  
 199. In the context of the “special sales codes” example mentioned earlier, supra note 
197, these dynamics are somewhat undermined by the fact that these codes are later distrib-
uted online through various forums (and accessible through search engines). Thus, the effort 
to discriminate among consumers is further undermined by various information flows. 
 200. See Benkler, supra note 74, at 157 (noting attempts by Amazon.com to engage in 
such discriminatory practices, and the severe repercussions it suffered as a result). 
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(a) Information Overload 
A rational decision-maker is assumed to search for information up to 
the point where the search costs exceed the expected value of the infor-
mation not yet revealed.201 However, empirical studies demonstrate that 
people act quite differently when they encounter cognitive impediments 
that undermine their ability to process information. The term “informa-
tion overload” is usually applied to acknowledge that people are 
overwhelmed by a deluge of information.202 Applying these findings to 
our context, some academics argue that consumers fail to carefully (if at 
all) examine SFCs due to information overload. Human limitations lead 
consumers to focus on a few salient traits of the underlying transaction: 
price, time of delivery, quality, and the like. They are likely to neglect 
many “non-salient” issues203 or the SFC in its entirety.204 
Application of this rationale to the online setting has sparked an in-
teresting debate among scholars. Some argue that although the online 
realm offers opportunities for users to obtain additional information 
about the transaction,205 this is offset by the abundance of online con-
tracts and by cognitive pressures on consumers in this environment.206 
Therefore, consumers are overwhelmed and overloaded by information 
online as well, and they disregard the relevant contract in its entirety, 
settling to only analyze and examine salient provisions.207  
The availability of information from ex post consumers and watch-
dog groups further complicates this question. At first blush, these aspects 
of the online world fail to improve the position of the confused ex ante 
consumers. The information flow dynamic addressed throughout this 
Article provides users with what they seem to need least: more informa-
tion. Even with such helpful information available, the overwhelmed 
consumers will ignore it.  
We believe, however, that the above data flow can prove constructive 
in this context as well. The ex post–ex ante information flow allows ex 
                                                                                                                      
 201. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (4th ed., 1987).  
 202. See, e.g., David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz, & Louis Wilde, The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 278 
(1986) (using a similar definition merely as a starting point).  
 203. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 451; Korobkin, supra note 36 
(explaining that consumers examine only five most salient attributes).  
 204. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305 
(1986). 
 205. For example, the ability to browse easily through the contract using various search 
functions.  
 206. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22. Note, however, that according to 
some recent surveys, users are not overwhelmed when engaging in searches for information 
regarding commerce online. Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra note 101, at 
38.  
 207. See Korobkin, supra note 36.  
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ante consumers to digest a great deal of information effectively, some-
times transforming non-salient, yet relevant, information into salient 
attributes. To understand how this happens, we must consider the two 
ways in which ex post consumers convey their opinions. First, consum-
ers provide an aggregated factor. In many cases, message boards and 
feedback mechanisms allow consumers to rank their interaction with 
various vendors on a numeric scale. Certain forums aggregate the factors 
mentioned into one overall number (or grade) that accounts for all the 
users.
208
 Second, consumers share their opinions by providing written 
and detailed accounts of their interaction with specific vendors.  
Consumers who resort to aggregated factors describing an online 
transaction will find them quite helpful in overcoming the information 
overload phenomenon. These aggregated factors allow users to concen-
trate on a limited data source that conveys abundant pertinent 
information. They are also easy to understand and consider when con-
templating whether to engage in a specific transaction. In providing their 
aggregated feedback, ex post consumers will also allocate great weight 
and attention to the provisions relating to their actual unfortunate experi-
ence, including those deemed “non-salient” ex ante. Hence, when ex 
ante consumers examine a specific grade provided by ex post consumers, 
they are receiving concise information that encapsulates the entire SFC 
(including non-salient provisions).  
Admittedly, this argument has at least two shortcomings. First, many 
of the mechanisms that provide aggregated feedback are vulnerable to 
manipulation by interested parties. Second, a negative (yet true and cor-
rect) review of various contractual provisions might be lost among, or 
offset by, other reviews wrongfully praising the products’ attributes.  
The first shortcoming is clearly problematic. Yet, and as explained 
above, these concerns are greatly mitigated in some forms of information 
flow by countering social forces on the one hand and technological 
measures on the other.209 The second shortcoming requires some addi-
tional thought, yet could be mitigated as well. Its resolution calls for a 
complex dynamic in which ex ante consumers rely on the collective wis-
dom of ex post ones. Recent scholarship explains that the collective 
wisdom of the masses may lead to true and accurate outcomes. This oc-
curs when the chances that any respondent within the mass (on his own) 
will answer the relevant question correctly exceed fifty percent (based on 
                                                                                                                      
 208. For a feedback system composed of four rated factors aggregated into an overall 
numeric rating of the vendor, see Epinions, http://www.epinions.com. These factors then ag-
gregate into one overall rating to account for all consumers. The consumer can also post a 
written review of the vendor. We thank Eric Goldman for this information.  
 209. See supra Part III.B.6.  
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a dynamic referred to as “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem”).210 Arguably, the 
question at hand—whether contractual terms are balanced, efficient and 
fair—is one that responding ex post consumers have a very good chance 
of answering correctly.211 Thus, the aggregated response would prove 
accurate and lead to an efficient outcome.  
The shortcomings arising from the use of aggregated factors could 
be further mitigated by the additional stream of information arriving 
from ex post consumers: written comments.212 In many instances, espe-
cially in the context of blogs and social networks, information is 
conveyed as actual descriptions of the interactions consumers experi-
enced vis-à-vis the vendor. Employing Edward Rubin’s terminology, 
online information flow in the form of written comments by experienced 
consumers will provide others with valuable “practical information”, 
rather than “theoretical information” they cannot use.213  
Here, critics of the NIA might point out that ex ante consumers will 
be overwhelmed when trying to seek out ex post feedback, and therefore 
will focus on feedback that concerns contractual attributes which are 
considered salient (such as price or quality). Therefore this dynamic as 
well will leave the problems of imbalanced non-salient provisions unre-
solved. This assertion might seem particularly convincing when 
considering the limited ability of ex ante consumers to approach the vast 
quantities of actual written comments.  
However, this assertion cannot stand. Ex ante consumers are, indeed, 
likely to seek out specific forms of comments and neglect others. Yet at 
this point, when ex ante consumers review ex post feedback, their atten-
tion is likely be drawn to different factors214—factors rendered salient 
                                                                                                                      
 210. Sunstein, supra note 121, at 60. Sunstein addresses the issue of when a specific 
question should be subjected to mass voting. Sunstein explains that the answer depends on 
whether the individuals formulating the mass response have a probability of over 50 percent to 
make the right decision. In these cases, the chances that the final response will prove accurate 
increase as the pool of responders grows. 
 211. Clearly, applying Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to this context requires additional 
empirical testing and theoretical analysis. Here we point out its relevance to this context, as 
well as state our intuition that the questions at hand could be easily responded to correctly by 
ex post consumers, especially those whom choose to voice their opinion, and, as mentioned 
above, act in many cases out of spite. See supra text accompanying note 146. 
 212. Strahilevitz, supra note 91, at 1756. See also Pei-yu Chen, Samita Dhanasobhon, & 
Michael D. Smith, All Reviews Are Not Created Equal: The Disaggregate Impact of Reviews 
and Reviewers at Amazon.com 19 (Carnegie Mellon U. Sch. Pub. Pol’y, & Mgmt., Working 
Paper No. 2007–12, 2006), available at http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/2451/14961/ 
2/USEDBOOK19.pdf. 
 213. Edward Rubin, The Internet, Consumer Protection and Practical Knowledge, in 
Consumer Protection in the Age of the “Information Economy,” supra note 67, at 35.  
 214. This point requires further empirical analysis that goes beyond the scope of this 
Article. Interestingly, Korobkin briefly addresses instances in which non-salient information 
can turn salient as a result of an information flow, which is similar to the ex post-ex ante one. 
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given the seriousness of the complaint against the vendor, or the severity 
of the vendor’s incompliance with acceptable social norms. Accordingly, 
a prospective consumer who searches the web and encounters negative 
information about the SFC she is about to enter will devote ample atten-
tion and consideration to it, even should it concern a provision which is 
usually considered non-salient.215  
(b) Surrounding Circumstances 
Another critique of the NIA argues that even if consumers are inter-
ested in adequately reviewing SFCs, often they will not because of 
various disturbances and disruptions at the time of the SFC formation. 
Noise, time constraints, and pressure from the vendor and fellow cus-
tomers alike prevent consumers from making optimal decisions at this 
juncture.216 The vendor also tries to create a “bond” between itself and 
the buyer, which the latter will be loath to break, so as not to “disap-
point” or “insult” the vendor’s agents. 
Applying this debate to the online setting leads to several outcomes. 
First, with regard to the consumer-seller online interaction and its impact 
on the consumer’s ability to assess SFC correctly, the existing literature 
yields mixed results.217 The absence of actual “sales talk,” personal con-
tact, and interaction in the negotiation process could arguably minimize 
the “commitment” and the bond that the consumer might forge with the 
vendor.218 On the other hand, the vendor in the online realm is able to 
tailor its virtual store and interface for every user. To do so, the vendor 
will take into account personal information about the specific user, and 
past “experiments” it conducted with other consumers in this setting.219 
With such abilities, vendors will be able to manipulate consumers, while 
creating a greater sense of self-commitment. 
Scholars also hold mixed opinions about the effects of other sur-
rounding and interfering circumstances online. Proponents of the NIA 
point out that the online realm relieves consumers of many of the  
                                                                                                                      
See supra note 36, at 1240. In Korobkin’s view, such instances will be rare. However, as 
shown throughout our analysis the Internet changes the conditions for such flow, rendering it 
quite common.  
 215. This might attest to a difference between “watchdogs” and the ex post–ex ante 
information flow emphasized in this Article: consumers’ reports of instances that actually 
occurred are likely to attract other consumers’ attention (as opposed to the dry analysis of the 
watchdog group, which addresses theoretical risks that might arise). 
 216. For a general discussion, see Peter Wright, The Harassed Decision-Maker: Time 
Pressure, Distraction, and the Use of Evidence, 59 J. Applied Psychol. 555 (1974). 
 217. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22.  
 218. Refusing to execute the contract online does not entail letting down any “real per-
son,” just a machine. 
 219. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 482. 
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cognitive pressures associated with the offline commercial setting. 
Online, users can engage in commerce in the comfort of their homes 
without being subjected to overpowering salespersons or annoying fel-
low consumers.220 Some “behavioral” NIA critics disagree, stating that 
the online setting creates noise and stress of its own: fear of privacy 
breaches, identity theft, and uncertainty as to when and how the transac-
tion will be concluded. Online transactions are also typically 
characterized by overall “jumpiness” (the urge to finalize the deal 
quickly and move on to something else).221 The online unique setting, 
likewise, creates an environment in which the consumer is left “to his 
own devices,” bereft of fellow consumers to discuss the transaction, and 
may thus be open to manipulation by vendors.222  
Adding the ex post–ex ante information flow to the debate again 
strengthens the validity of the NIA in the online realm. At first blush, one 
might argue that this additional data flow will only add to the consumers’ 
confusion as it generates a great deal of “interference” that consumers 
must contend with online. However, the ex post–ex ante flow offers a 
great advantage: it renders the e-commerce experience far friendlier, 
while reducing consumer anxiety and stress, hence “noise.” It does so by 
allowing consumers to understand and feel they are not alone. When 
consumers are able to exchange information easily about the underlying 
transaction in forums, message boards, and social networks, they are 
more likely to acquire the ability to calculate rationally the pros and cons 
of the transaction at stake.223  
(c) Self-Serving Biases Regarding Risk Evaluation 
“Behaviorist” critics of the NIA state that even when relevant and 
accurate information is available to consumers, they will often neverthe-
less err in evaluating their own risk and exposure due to over-confidence 
and over-optimism.224 At first sight, this critique seems unchallenged by 
the shift to the online realm. The NIA critics might also note the online 
vendors’ ability to tailor their interactions with consumers to their per-
                                                                                                                      
 220. Id. at 478.  
 221. Id. at 480.  
 222. Id. at 482.  
 223. The online information flow might also protect users from the manipulative prac-
tices vendors adopt. Once observed, knowledge of their existence will be passed on to other 
consumers. Arguably, once consumers know about the manipulation they face, its effects are 
mitigated. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Online Privacy, Tailoring and Persuasion, in Privacy and 
Technologies of Identity—A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation 209, 217 (K. Strand-
burg & D. Stan Raicu eds., 2006)  
 224. For an illustration of people’s generally unrealistic-optimistic approach, see Lynn 
A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439 (1993). 
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sonal traits, while applying various psychological strategies to further 
manipulate consumers into an enhanced sense of over-optimism and 
confidence.225 Commentators have argued that the online realm leads us-
ers into a “click-happy” mode of thought,226 in which they readily 
dispense funds without properly considering possible detriments.227 
Yet again, this critique is mitigated in the presence of the informa-
tion flow that this Article addresses. Reviewing information flowing 
from the ex post stage, consumers will be exposed to data which goes 
beyond mere descriptions of events that may or may not occur with low 
probability in the distant future (as presented in the SFC). Rather, they 
will face complaints and testimony of fellow shoppers about events that 
actually happened.228 These sources of information229 will counter con-
sumers’ tendencies for over-optimism with harsh facts about online 
contracting.230  
Furthermore, as consumers receive more information from blogs, 
message boards, and social networks, the overall (and problematic) op-
timism and “click-happy” feeling that arguably characterize the online 
environment will be substantially dampened. This dampening will occur 
because spite is one of the most “promising” motivators of online con-
sumer feedback,231 and thus negative feedback is likely to characterize 
the ex post-ex ante flow.232 The overall negative sentiment of these  
                                                                                                                      
 225. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 482. 
 226. Id. at 480.  
 227. One can easily argue for the opposite position, since online consumers encounter 
additional risks and hazards. See supra text accompanying notes 220–221. Therefore, con-
sumers would arguably be more inclined to investigate all aspects of the online transaction, 
including a review of the relevant SFC.  
 228. It is significant that fellow shoppers convey this testimony, as it may serve as a de-
biasing technique. This is especially so, since narratives are more salient than dry facts, and 
having in mind a real person who suffered increases the psychological vividness.  
 229. A critical reader might argue that the “click happy” consumers might not even 
check on their relevant vendors. However, empirical evidence indicates a cultural shift in 
online behavior. Users are now using the comparison shopping applications at their fingertips. 
In the broader context, this is reflected in the practice of “Googling” everything and everyone. 
See, e.g., Who’s Googling You Right Now?, CNN.com, March 13, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/TECH/internet/03/13/web.searches.reut (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). Therefore, the acts 
of double checking on online entities need not reflect pessimism, but conventional caution that 
most “netizens” exercise in today’s competitive markets and society. 
 230. While the dynamic described here clearly counters the biases addressed above, we 
still must examine whether these two effects are calibrated. We leave this for future research.  
 231. See supra note 146. 
 232. Negative feedback is not always the dominant force online. On eBay, for instance, 
users generally provide positive feedback. This may be because many of the evaluators are 
sellers themselves, or because users strive to maintain the “coziness” of the eBay community. 
These rationales, however, will not apply where consumers provide feedback for large B2C 
online vendors, so in our opinion they are of limited relevance. For a discussion of the eBay 
Trust system, see Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet 
Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System 3 (Feb. 5, 2001) (unpublished 
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feedback circles might give rise to several concerns, but in this context it 
can potentially offset the positive sentiment of a “click-happy” environ-
ment, affording consumers a more balanced state of mind.  
(d) Perception of “Self-Commitment” 
An additional critique of the NIA asserts that consumers will fail to 
properly evaluate SFCs at the time of contract formation due to their 
commitment to the transactions at hand. Consumers generate this sense 
of commitment because they have already devoted resources to the 
transaction at stake while exhausting their limited mental ability and pa-
tience.233 Vendors are well aware of this dynamic and attempt to inflate 
such “self-commitment.” They do so by presenting the terms of the SFC 
at a very late stage of the negotiation process, when most consumers 
have already made up their minds to execute the transaction. On the face 
of it, online vendors can try to increase consumers’ commitment by re-
quiring them to go through many “windows” within the interface without 
first being able to view the relevant SFC.234  
Yet again, the ex post–ex ante information flow provides a strong re-
sponse to this critique and promotes acceptance of the NIA online. Here, 
consumers are able to gather information from the other sources noted 
above. Consumers then do not have to rely upon the vendor to present 
the SFC. Prospective consumers can learn of possible flaws in the SFC 
early in the shopping process, even before they become invested in the 
transaction.235 These sources will also provide information about the po-
tentially manipulative practices that vendors might attempt (such as 
presenting the final terms of the transaction at a late stage).  
To conclude our discussion of the NIA online, we find that many of 
its powerful critiques are mitigated by the ex post-ex ante information 
flow addressed in this Article. Yet the mitigating effects of this flow de-
pend on several variables, and could be promoted by various regulatory 
steps. We now define these steps and explain how they should be consid-
ered by courts and promoted by legislators. 
                                                                                                                      
paper), available at http://www-csag.ucsd.edu/teaching/cse225s04/Reading%20List/E-bay-
Empirical-BodegaBay.pdf. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41.  
 234. This situation differs from the offline realm, where an assertive consumer can de-
mand the SFC from the vendor’s agent at an earlier stage. A limited pretest carried out by our 
research assistant indicated that many online vendors indeed engage in these practices. For 
example, vendors allow online users to read the full terms of service only at a relatively late 
stage of the transaction. Yifat Gedanken, Analyzing SFCs Access and Content Online (Sept. 
2006) (unpublished research study) (on file with authors). 
 235. A possible difficulty might be the existence of “sales talk” and manipulative con-
duct by vendors within the virtual online communities. As we explained, various means and 
phenomena exist to counter these forms of manipulation.  
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V. Policy Recommendation 
In this part, we examine how the novel insights we presented above 
should reflect on policy choices regarding online SFCs. Many of our 
recommendations do not contradict regulatory recommendations made 
by other scholars but aim to complement them. For instance, various 
proposed regulatory steps strive to promote ex ante reading of SFCs.236 
We favor these steps, but believe their overall impact is quite limited.237 
Nor do we object to regulatory steps which provide a “safe harbor” for 
pre-approved SFCs (by courts or other administrative agencies). While 
such policies have been suggested in the online context,238 and even 
broadly applied in some jurisdictions in the general context,239 to date 
they have evinced limited success.240 Therefore, while we acknowledge 
this solution as one which might lead to market efficiency and fairness,241 
we consider an alternative way to achieve contract approval (or disap-
proval) online: through the collaborative, yet uncoordinated, efforts of ex 
post consumers.  
The remainder of this Part sets forth concrete policy recommenda-
tions, while striving to meet two objectives. First, to provide regulators 
and courts with several potential considerations to identify instances in 
which legal intervention in online SFC is necessary. Second, to point out 
ways in which online information flows could be strengthened, ex-
panded, and to the extent possible, cleared of unaccredited and false 
information. 
A. Potential Considerations for Legal Intervention  
In today’s ever-changing environment, it is impossible to broadly de-
fine or identify markets which demonstrate (or lack) information flows 
                                                                                                                      
 236. Scholars propose that SFCs be made available to consumers in an early stage; that 
they be written in clear language; and that they specifically and plainly address “suspicious” 
issues which in many cases are imbalanced in B2C SFC. See generally Robert Hillman, 
Online Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal 
Implications in Consumer Protection in the Age of the “Information Economy,” supra 
note 67, at 283. 
 237. See supra Part I.D (briefly explaining the shortcomings of the NIA model).  
 238. Gillette, supra note 15, at 983. 
 239. Such as Israel. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, A Fresh Approach to the Long-Lasting 
Puzzle of Consumer Standard Form Contracts 160–63 (May 2005) (unpublished JSD disserta-
tion, Yale Law School) (on file with authors).  
 240. For possible explanations as to why this mechanism has not succeeded in Israel, 
see, for example, id. at 249–56.  
 241. For a detailed discussion, see Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval 
Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. Mich. 
J.L. Reform (forthcoming 2009). 
ZARSKY BECHER ITP 4_C.DOC 5/9/2008  11:33 AM 
358 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:303 
 
that can guarantee fair and efficient SFCs.242 To overcome this difficulty, 
we offer two sets of considerations to assist courts at this juncture, which 
should be developed as time passes and empirical data gathered. The 
first set refers to instances in which a reliable and robust ex post–ex ante 
information flow exists. The second set indicates a strong possibility of 
problems in such flow.243  
1. Elements Which Promote the “Non-Intervention” Approach244  
(a) The Vendor Promotes, Without Interference, an  
Ex Post–Ex Ante Information Flow 
Allowing a rich discourse among ex post and ex ante consumers 
within the confines of the vendor’s website permits even the less sophis-
ticated consumers to obtain important information. Such conduct clearly 
promotes information flow, which facilitates broad acceptance of the 
NIA online. At the same time, indications that vendors maintain their 
discretion to delete messages not to their liking, or that they use this plat-
form for more sales talk, will diminish the positive effects of such 
mechanisms.245  
(b) The Volume of the Ex Post–Ex Ante Information Flow 
To respond to this difficult query, courts can make use of several 
proxies. Intuitively, a heavy flow of ex post–ex ante information will be 
closely correlated to the vendor’s size, revenue, market share, the length 
of time it has been operational in the online realm, and the number of 
unique online communities devoted to the relevant market.246 On a more 
                                                                                                                      
 242. Accordingly, courts should allow parties to provide evidence and expert testimony 
to prove the existence or absence of these elements. 
 243. In examining these elements courts address the transaction and market dynamics in 
general, and need not consider whether the specific consumer has reviewed information accru-
ing from the ex post–ex ante flow. Given that markets respond to consumers in the aggregate, 
this inquiry is of limited importance. Cf. Korobkin, supra note 36, at 1283 (making a similar 
point yet reaching different policy recommendations).  
 244. An element we do not tackle in the text is the market share of “repeating consum-
ers” that make use of the relevant SFCs. A large market share of such consumers should 
indicate a robust and very efficient ex post–ex ante flow. However, relying upon this element 
is problematic, as both offline and online firms succeed in targeting these consumers, thus 
rendering them somewhat irrelevant to our overall analysis. 
 245. In our opinion, taking additional steps which would prohibit such censorship, or 
addressing the actions of the entities controlling various online fora, are problematic, as they 
might be construed as an unfair limitation on the free speech rights of various parties. For this 
reason, we touch on these forms of problematic actions tangentially.  
 246. See also Steve J. J. Tedjamulia, et. al., Motivating Content Contributions to Online 
Communities: Toward a More Comprehensive Theory, 38th Annual Hawaii International Con-
ference on Systems Sciences (2005) (mentioning several indicators of an active online 
community, including the existence of “fresh content”). 
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concrete level, courts can also examine the ease and probability with 
which consumers encounter information flows en route to the vendors’ 
website, while navigating through the use of search engines.247 Clearly, 
ongoing research constantly being carried out in this field will provide 
additional indicators for the courts to consider.  
2. Elements Which Promote the “Intervention” Approach248  
(a) Recent or Frequent Changes in the SFC 
Such changes render the information flow somewhat moot. When 
vendors frequently and substantially change their SFC, feedback pro-
vided by ex post consumers will be irrelevant for ex ante ones (as the 
former will be commenting on a legal setting no longer valid). There-
fore, the ex post–ex ante flow cannot fulfill its purpose.  
(b) Discrimination in Contractual Terms249 
Discrimination enables vendors to mitigate the market dynamic, 
which ensures that all consumers will benefit from the scrutiny of a lim-
ited group of consumers. Where contractual discrimination exists, the 
majority of users will still be at an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the online vendor.250  
(c) Vendor’s Attempts to Tamper With Data Flows 
As mentioned, a growing number of vendors now promote their 
brands through various social networks, blogs, and message boards.251 
While most of these actions are legitimate, some vendors might choose 
to promote their brand aggressively under the pretext of consumers 
merely praising the vendors’ product or service. Clearly, such actions 
will contaminate the ex post–ex ante information flow and its various 
outcomes addressed throughout this Article. The SFCs of vendors apply-
ing these practices should be subject to stricter scrutiny.252 
                                                                                                                      
 247. For instance, courts can examine whether relevant message boards and other points 
of virtual congregation are “visible” (as both sponsored and non-sponsored links) on relevant 
search pages, when keywords related to the vendor are submitted. However, such an inquiry 
must also take into account the forms of routes used by consumers to the vendors’ website 
(i.e., how many consumers indeed pass through search engines to get to the website, and in 
that way encounter these alternative sources).  
 248. We add to the elements mentioned the absence of a rich ex post–ex ante informa-
tion flow, which mirrors supra element 1.b.  
 249. We refer to discrimination ex ante. See supra notes 17; text following note 195.  
 250. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 22, at 475 (making a similar point).  
 251. See supra Part III.B.6.  
 252. See supra note 165 (noting that such actions should also be dealt with through other 
means). 
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(d) Difficulties in Reviewing the SFC 
The ex post–ex ante information flow is partially premised on ex 
post consumers’ ability to review their SFCs at a later time. If a vendor 
obstructs retrieval of this document, this important segment of the data 
flow will be stalled. These cases call for additional scrutiny as well.253  
(e) “Buried Provisions” Rarely Applied 
When the SFC provision addressed in a specific complaint is only 
rarely applied by the vendor, an ex post–ex ante flow will not occur.254 In 
these cases, policy makers cannot rely on Marginal Consumers to deter 
the vendor from including imbalanced provisions.255  
B. Promoting and Increasing Information Flow 
In this section, we address several strategies for promoting the ex 
post–ex ante information flow. As many Internet-based businesses are 
now learning, online user participation is a fickle matter. There are no 
foolproof, or even simple, ways to increase this flow. Here, we offer pre-
liminary suggestions that will require additional fine tuning as time goes 
by.  
1. Direct Governmental Intervention  
(Or: “How’s My Contract?”)  
Providing governmental platforms for ex post consumers to convey 
their satisfaction with and thoughts about relevant SFC provisions can 
increase the information flow. By setting up “hotlines,” email addresses, 
and forums devoted to these issues, regulators can signal the importance 
of this issue and encourage users to provide information about it. Rather 
than attending to the complaints and sanctioning the vendors the con-
sumers mention in their complaints (a task that governments are clearly 
                                                                                                                      
 253. Vendors who systematically provide consumers with a glimpse of their SFCs only 
at the end of the purchasing process might similarly be treated with suspicion. They might 
engage in such conduct to increase the consumers’ commitment to the transactional process. 
However, the inability to review the SFC ex ante is mitigated, considering the ability to re-
ceive information from ex post consumers. See also Hillman, supra note 181.  
 254. We understand that applying this rule in practice would prove difficult, as the party 
arguing for the existence of rarely applied contractual provisions (the consumer) will have 
limited or no resources to prove its existence. One way to overcome this difficulty is to adopt a 
procedural rule, according to which courts encountering a provision they find suspiciously 
imbalanced will shift the burden regarding this matter to the respondent (the vendor). In other 
words, the vendor must meet the burden of proving that the provision at stake is enforced in 
other instances (information it should have no problem obtaining). We leave the details of this 
proposal for future research projects.  
 255. For a similar discussion, see supra note 17; text following note 195 (explaining and 
applying ex post discrimination).  
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unable to do, due to limited budgets and workforce) the government 
should “open” the data streaming from such platforms to the broader 
public. This would allow consumers to learn from the ex post complaints 
of others. Of course, these databases must include search functions, and 
perhaps tools to generate and store relevant metadata,256 so interested 
users can easily find the information they need at a later time. 
As the title of this section suggests, this model is based on an inter-
esting method of cheap and efficient law enforcement recently discussed 
by Lior Strahilevitz in the context of safe driving.257 As Strahilevitz 
points out, this model could be expanded to other contexts as well.258 
However, regulators applying this scheme must face the two obstacles 
we noted throughout our analysis: motivating the public to contribute to 
this database and accreditation of the contributors to it (and the facts 
they convey).259 
Motivations can vary. Many consumers will act out of spite, some 
out of altruism, and others in the actual hope that peers within the com-
munity might assist them in confronting the relevant vendor. It is very 
difficult to predict whether these motivations will suffice, given that the 
time and attention required to present the complaint within these plat-
forms might be non-trivial.260 Therefore, regulators might have to 
consider other ways—such as compensation261—to further motivate  
                                                                                                                      
 256. For the information to be easily searchable, users should add “tags” as to the topics 
that the relevant information “bit” addresses.  
 257. See Strahilevitz, supra note 91. The actual enforcement against incautious drivers 
whose problematic records are revealed through this dynamic is done by the police, insurance 
firms or employers with large car pools. 
 258. Strahilevitz states that this dynamic could be implemented in any setting “in which 
conformity is unproblematic, median voter judgments are informative, a broad social consen-
sus exists regarding appropriate behavior, and the benefits of reputation tracking exceed the 
costs. We are, in short, looking for environments in which the prevalent social norms are uni-
versal and efficient.” Id. at 1762. SFCs policy and doctrine would seem to fall within the 
confines of this description. Strahilevitz notes that efficient citizen enforcement can occur in 
close-knit groups, where repeat players’ interactions are common and information flows eas-
ily. In some instances, technologies transform loose-knit groups into close-knit ones. Given 
the technology and information flow addressed above, the SFC setting might fit these parame-
ters as well (though the challenges of motivation and accreditation show that changing a 
loose-knit group into a close-knit one is very difficult).  
 259. See supra Part III.B.6. These problems are likely to arise in almost any context of 
peer-produced knowledge. In the driving context, based on experiences in virtual communities 
such as eBay, Strahilevitz concludes that the internal motivations of individuals to participate 
and even to spite others (in this instance, dangerous drivers) should suffice. He also believes 
that accreditation concerns could be mitigated by technological tools. Strahilevitz, supra note 
91, at 1762. 
 260. This contrasts with the situation described by Strahilevitz, where the citizen has to 
make a single phone call and leave a brief message about the other driver. Id.  
 261. In other contexts of online user participatory projects, users are sometimes moti-
vated by promises of compensation. For instance, video sharing websites and blog operators 
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consumers to contribute. For instance, regulators might adopt schemes 
that offer prizes to consumers whose complaint is found most relevant, 
or payment to those who contribute to the database on an ongoing ba-
sis.262 Alternatively, the government could encourage consumers to 
contribute to this database and “complaint center” by promising to look 
into selected queries and requests, and to occasionally fund the legal bat-
tles that might ensue. 
Accreditation is an additional concern, as vendors might continu-
ously log onto this system anonymously, praise their own products, and 
vilify their competitors.263 While some assume these concerns could be 
settled through the use of sophisticated algorithms and other means,264 
we tend to be skeptical as to whether Strahilevitz’s interesting model 
would suit this consumer-oriented context. Here, “ballot stuffing” might 
be too easy and appealing, given that the stakes for vendors are high, the 
incentive to slander competitors is substantial, and the interaction will 
not be subject to “community” attributes and norms. Therefore, more 
research is necessary before such a mechanism can be chosen as means 
to produce a meaningful and reliable information flow.  
2. Indirect Promotion and Incentives 
(a) Funding 
Beyond the governmental database, regulators can promote the ex 
post–ex ante information flow by funding entities, which enhance the 
flow by structuring and supporting various online social networks. Such 
subsidies are especially important to facilitate small virtual communities 
with strong social ties, which are thought to provide the most accurate 
and reliable information, yet might be unable to support their own exis-
tence.265 However, such funding need not be necessary, as there appears 
to be an abundance of commercial revenue flows that support these ven-
tures. Accordingly, the government might be required to intervene and 
provide subsidies only if and when information provided throughout 
                                                                                                                      
offer prizes or actual payment for those providing the highest ranked or “most viewed” con-
tent. See supra note 150 (discussing schemes adopted by MetaCafe and YouTube).  
 262. However, these strategies might be inappropriate, and even lead to attempts to 
“game” this system in order to reap compensation. In addition, even though many contracts 
are imbalanced, promoting litigious behavior demands stringent justification.  
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 138–139.  
 264. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 91, at 1735 (noting that eBay has proved success-
ful in blocking gaming, and that gaming could be somewhat countered by requiring users to 
identify themselves when registering a complaint).  
 265. For a discussion of such subsidies in a somewhat different context (of copyright and 
the distribution of ideas), see Zarsky, supra note 131, at 711.  
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these realms runs the risk of being tainted by commercial interests (and 
thus not produce the beneficial outcomes addressed above).  
(b) Facilitating Meta-Searches and Meta-Databases 
While the Internet is full of “locations” where ex post information 
can be found, the information is becoming quite dispersed. Often, ex 
ante consumers must consult many online locations before they can for-
mulate an opinion about the relevant underlying vendor and it’s SFC. 
Governments might assist by providing tools to ensure that many of 
these sources can be accessed and searched simultaneously and easily.266 
Again, such steps might not be required should sufficient commercial 
incentives lead to the creation of similar private ventures.267  
(c) “Spillover Effects” From Other Legal Doctrines 
Regulators and courts should consider other legal issues that might 
influence the issue at hand and enhance the crucial data flow among ex 
post and ex ante consumers. We briefly refer to two such instances be-
low.  
i. Trademark Law 
The lack of geographical points of congregation where ex post and 
ex ante consumers might interact is a major obstacle to successful online 
information flow.268 As explained,269 possible substitutes for geographical 
sites are virtual ones where consumers meet and exchange information. 
Even though the online realm lacks “sidewalks,”270 it introduces several 
strategies to attract consumers to various virtual locations. Some of these 
strategies involve the use of brand names by entities that do not control 
the rights to their usage. For instance, a search engine is paid by a third 
party to present specific information when a brand name is used as a 
search term, so to lure consumers to their web pages which include con-
tent related to a B2C transaction. 
                                                                                                                      
 266. For instance, governments can fund research for projects that will accomplish such 
tasks efficiently.  
 267. Creating such an aggregated commercial database, or even search engine, might 
raise difficulties in terms of the copyrights, property rights, and contractual rights of those 
operating the individual websites now “crawled” and aggregated. For instance, creating a 
database that would index information available on other websites to facilitate future searches 
could constitute a “trespass to chattel” vis-à-vis the forum or social network whose informa-
tion is included in the relevant index. Hence, regulatory intervention might be required to meet 
this important objective and allow for the creation of these indices while preempting the men-
tioned rights of the website operators.  
 268. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 269. Id.  
 270. See sources cited supra note 83. 
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Over the last few years, vendors and owners of IP rights of well 
known brands have attempted to stop users and competitors from apply-
ing these strategies through the use of various legal measures.271 Courts 
have delivered contradictory rulings on these issues.272 Legislators have 
yet to voice their opinion on this matter. We call on both regulators and 
courts to bear in mind the implications of these rules for the ex post–ex 
ante information flow.  
ii. Privacy and Defamation 
Much of the valuable information flow we address throughout this 
Article is negative. In some instances it might be false. It is almost al-
ways presented by a party who shields his or her “real identity” from the 
broader public (and perhaps from the publishing platform as well). Ven-
dors, who are learning the great importance of this discourse, constantly 
try to block and deter the spreading of these forms of negative informa-
tion. One way to achieve this purpose is to sue for defamation. Vendors 
can do so by applying several strategies. First, they can sue the entity 
conveying the message—the online content provider—for secondary 
liability.273 Second, they can demand that the online content provider turn 
over information on the actual identity of the alleged defamer, and sue 
her or him for direct liability.274  
The issues of secondary and direct liability in online defamation law, 
as well as the instances in which content providers must provide infor-
mation about their users, are constantly in flux.275 Laws and judicial 
rulings on these matters will directly affect the breadth and quality of the 
ex post–ex ante information flow.276 Therefore, regulators and courts 
                                                                                                                      
 271. They did so by applying trademark doctrines prohibiting search engine operators 
from selling keywords which include their brand, and domain name administrators from al-
lowing the use of addresses which resemble trademarked terms. They also used various legal 
doctrines to block attempts of others to improve their search rank while making use of their 
trademarked brands (through invisible metatags and other strategies). 
 272. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy 
in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory L.J. 507, 561 (2005) (discussing keyword metatags and 
trademark law); id. at 551 n.159 (discussing domain name and trademark protection).  
 273. Currently, those entities can be held liable only in very rare instances. See Daniel 
Solove, Marc Rotenberg & Paul Schwartz, Information Privacy Law 163 (2003). 
This is due to the protection these entities are afforded according to section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). See also Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327 (4th Cir. 1997).  
 274. For a discussion and analysis of anonymity in the online context, see Solove et 
al., supra note 273, at 480.  
 275. Id. 
 276. Often consumers will agree to provide critical perspectives and insights only when 
protected by anonymity. See Sunstein, supra note 121, at 210.  
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should keep these implications in mind when setting the outer borders of 
defamation, third party liability, and the limits of online anonymity.277 
Conclusion 
This Article strives to provide policy makers with an analytical plat-
form that will assist in the construction of legal rules that should govern 
the online sphere. The online realm can be a great source of growth and 
prosperity for both online vendors and ordinary citizens. In spite of this 
potential, or maybe because of it, consumer protection proponents, as 
well as courts and legislatures, must be vigilant. To promote the effi-
ciency and fairness of SFCs, we must take into account new means and 
aspects of information flow among consumers. Having reviewed the 
economic and behavioral aspects of this flow, we conclude that careful 
tailoring of legal intervention in, and treatment of, online B2C SFCs is 
needed.  
The ex post-ex ante information flow dynamic analyzed in this Arti-
cle is already influencing online standard form contracting behavior and 
practices. Surfers devote blogs, and other online tools, to discuss SFCs.278 
In addition, a recently published study indicates that online B2C SFCs 
are not one-sided as we tend to assume they are279—perhaps a result of 
the dynamic we address here. We believe that technological develop-
ments, combined with clever legislative initiatives and judicial 
understanding of the new online contracting environment, create an in-
valuable opportunity to turn standard form contracting governance on its 
head. This opportunity must not be missed. 
The analysis presented in this Article is applicable to an even 
broader context of commerce and markets, namely several forms of 
offline commerce as well. The heart of the thesis presented here is, 
therefore, not the act of online contracting, but of online information 
flow. Nonetheless, throughout this analysis, we chose to focus our at-
tention on online SFCs, as engaging in online commerce indicates a 
certain level of computer knowledge and ability to partake in and  
                                                                                                                      
 277. For more on the role of the courts in framing the discourse throughout social net-
works by applying these torts, see Zarsky, supra note 165. 
 278. See, e.g., Ed Foster’s Gripelog, http://www.gripe2ed.com/scoop (last visited Feb. 
20, 2008); Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/wp/eula.php (last visited Feb. 
20, 2008) (collecting examples of unfavorable terms); EULA Library, 
http://www.fairterms.org/EULALibrary.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (collecting links to 
sites with one-sided terms). 
 279. See Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet 
Retail Contracting 108 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008) available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=988788.  
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benefit from the online information flow. With time, this dynamic might 
become widespread and pertain to many forms of offline transactions as 
well.  
